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 4 
Introduction 
 
What is education? I should suppose that education 
was the curriculum one had to run through in order to 
catch up with oneself, and he who will not pass 
through this curriculum is helped very little by the fact 
that he was born in the most enlightened age. 
(Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 1843) 
 
 
"With all the money that we are throwing away on humanities and art - give me that 
money and I will build you to be a better student" - goes a saying attributed to Marvin 
Minsky. For hundreds of years humanities claimed to be able to build something greater 
than a better student, namely a better human being. This was humanities' main device of 
self-legitimisation, what distinguished it from the other disciplines from a practical 
perspective. Starting from the assumption that human character can be improved, and 
that we can all become better citizens, better individuals, or better moral agents, 
humanities claimed to do just that. However, with the advent of the 21st century, an 
event that would transform the public perception on education took place. It goes under 
the label of ‘the Bologna Process’ and it had specific claims about what education 
should aim for. Change through education received a new impetus towards an 
unexpected direction, far from the traditional areas of humanities. Education was now 
about constructing the future employee, and humanities were called together with other 
disciplines to reorient their discourse towards the new dominant paradigm of 
employability. But can humanities be used to achieve employability? Should humanities 
even strive towards this purpose? Is the employable student a ‘better student’? 
 
These questions all start from the common following observation: The architects of the 
Bologna Process assumed, albeit often implicitly or unreflectively, that that the meaning 
of a good life is the employee’s life or ‘the life in labour’, and this perspective needs to 
be challenged as there are certainly other ways of giving meaning and purpose to a 
human life. From a liberal perspective, for instance, one might hold that it should be the 
individual’s own choice how to define his/her own meaning of the good life; yet 
nowadays, through its discourse on education, the Bologna Process together with other 
higher education policies, institutions that call themselves liberal, such as the 
 5 
institutions of the EU, are imposing a narrow understanding of the good life.  
 
For centuries it has been the purpose of humanities to examine the assumptions of the 
mainstream conceptions about human life, and give its scholars the necessary tools to 
challenge these assumptions. Therefore, scholars in the humanities would perhaps be 
good candidates in answering the challenge posed by the Bologna Process to our 
understandings of education and the good life. However, humanities are now in a crisis 
of self-justification brought on by the Bologna Process itself. Being self-reflexive, the 
humanities have a long-standing experience of the ‘crisis’; passing through ‘crisis’, as 
the etymology of the word1 indicates, is a way of reinventing oneself. Yet the crisis that 
arose after the launch of the Bologna Process - it is often claimed - would be of a special 
nature, i.e. institutional: it is not epistemic, but rather a crisis for the justification of the 
usefulness of humanities in the new educational context centred on the employability 
imperative. Therefore, the main research question that this paper aims to answer is: ‘In 
what does today’s attack on humanities consist and how can humanities be defended?’ 
In order to answer this research question, one needs first to describe how the humanities 
have argued for their usefulness before the Bologna Process; second, provide reasons 
for the claim that the Bologna Process would be a new type of attack; and third, analyse 
the new defences for the humanities, so as to discuss whether these are suitable.  
 
Humanities have been criticised for their lack of ‘usefulness’ from ancient times, 
perhaps the first famous such case was the story of Thales falling into a well while 
looking at the sky. This story is mentioned in Plato’s dialogue Theætetus through 
Socrate’s voice:  
"the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about 
Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he 
was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what 
was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. 
For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbour; he is 
ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or 
an animal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy in enquiring what 
                                                          
1 Crisis comes from the ancient Greek word Krisis, ‘decision’, which comes from the verb krinein 
‘decide’. The medical sense, as used by Hippocrates or Galen, designates the turning point in a disease, 
after which the patient either dies or gets better. In a general sense it means a decisive point, a moment of 
truth before resolving an issue; it does not necessarily signify a negative transformation, as it can lead 
towards a positive one. Source: Online Etymology Dictionnary, found at 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=crisis 
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belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other."2 
The laughter of the handmaiden reverberates again and again all through the history of 
humanities, whenever the humanist scholars were asked to justify the usefulness of their 
research for the immediate needs of the community. But it must be noted that this 
metaphorical laughter was not an attack of the value of humanities, nor did imply that 
humanities should be abandoned for more useful occupations. The philosopher and the 
handmaiden could both inhabit peacefully the same world, even though they saw it with 
different eyes. Usefulness was not important for the scholar, while it was the measure of 
all things for the handmaidens of this world. Even though some criticism of humanities’ 
usefulness is to be found again and again throughout history, it is this paper’s working 
hypothesis that the Bologna Process did not mount a criticism of humanities, but an 
attack at an institutional level. This type of institutional attack cannot be answered with 
the usual arguments of inter-academic debates that were employed, for example, when 
the postmodernists attacked the ideal of Bildung. As a response to this attack, stemming 
from outside academia, the humanities are currently undergoing a new crisis of 
legitimation, which needs new types of answers if the humanities are to survive and 
reinvent themselves yet again.  
 
Methodology 
 
As stated previously, the research question ‘In what does today’s attack on humanities 
consist and how can humanities be defended?’ can be addressed by pursuing three 
preliminary enquiries; to each enquiry we have dedicated a chapter in this paper. 
First, in order to describe how the humanities have argued for their usefulness before 
the Bologna Process, this paper shall review some of the previously employed 
arguments in favour of the humanities. The writings which we have taken the arguments 
from are grouped on the basis of a two-fold criteria: they are grouped thematically by 
their common perspective on the student, and they follow roughly a chronological 
order, which starts in the Italian Renaissance (the first time the term studia humanitatis 
is used systematically to designate a branch of disciplines), go through the German 
Enlightenment (focusing on the moment of the articulation of Bildung as a legitimising 
                                                          
2 Plato, Theaetetus, Penguin classics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, New York, N.Y., 
U.S.A.: Penguin Books; Viking Penguin, 1987), Translated by Robin Waterfield, §§ Theætetus 147A. 
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device for the humanities), and end in the 20st century, namely in the postmodernist 
movement as a major criticism of the Bildung ideal. 
 
Second, in order to provide reasons for the claim that the Bologna Process would be a 
new type of attack, not merely a criticism, this paper will analyse the texts of the 
Bologna ministerial communiqués from 1999 to 2012. These documents offer a 
delimited and relevant corpus of texts, because these communiqués are official 
statements that offer a privileged outlook on the aims, ideals and policy principles that 
inspired the Bologna Process. We shall analyse how certain key terms are used in these 
communiqués: student, graduate, education, stakeholder, society. The analysis of the 
documents will be looking for answers to the following questions: 1) what is the main 
mission of education in the EHEA vision?; 2) what are the graduates supposed to 
become after their studies?; 3) how are the students perceived and described? These 
three enquiries that guide the text analysis will help us outline an answer to the main 
underlying question: ‘who is being educated in the Bologna Process?’ 
 
Third, an analysis of the contemporary defences of the humanities is based on a 
literature review of some of the most important arguments put forth in the contemporary 
debate, which will follow a thematic order centred on the two main strategies of 
defence. The first of these strategies consists in arguing for the usefulness of scholarly 
knowledge in general, whereas the other strategy concerns the construction of the 
democratic citizen that is needed for our current democratic practises.  
 
Most scholars agree that the Bologna Process was prepared by two major shifts in 
Western societies: the massification of higher education and the passage toward a 
knowledge economy. The massification of education happened in Europe and the USA 
after the Second World War when, within a few years, the number of students increased 
exponentially. Before the war education in the universities was destined for the 2% - 3% 
of the population, the so-called elites. In the 1960s several European countries boasted 
with a percent of 20-30% of students from the relevant age population.3 This change 
posed a challenge to the higher educational systems that needed to adapt quickly to a 
                                                          
3 Martin Trow, “Reflections on the Transition from Elite to Mass to Universal Access: Forms and 
Phases of Higher Education in Modern Societies since WWII,” in International Handbook of Higher 
Education, ed. Philip G. Altbach (Springer, 2006), 243–80, 243. 
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high input of students and become relevant for the many, not just for the privileged few. 
In this context, a question that academia had not been forced to confront emerges as a 
crucial and most relevant question to ask: ‘who is being educated?’ becomes most 
relevant. Since the answers to this question will guide our analysis of the arguments in 
favour of humanities, an explanation of this choice is welcome.  
 
Guiding Question: Who is the Subject of Education? 
 
Anyone wishing to justify the need to include humanities in the curricula needs to 
answer the question: why should humanities be taught in the universities? This is a 
normative question, and the defenders of humanities strive for an answer that will have 
a normative component. In order to argue for a position claiming that ‘we need the 
humanities in education’, one needs to be clear about what the purpose of education is. 
Therefore, an Aristotelian distinction regarding the purpose of education can be useful. 
This distinction, that I will make use of in order to single out what should be the guiding 
question in order to make sense of the type of arguments about education that this paper 
deals with, was elaborated by Aristotle in his investigation into what a good human 
being and what a virtuous citizen would need to know in the best of republics; 
Aristotle’s main distinction can be found in the book III of Politics, sections 4 and 5. 
 
As it is well known, for Aristotle everything was understood as teleological, meaning 
that everything had a purpose and was striving towards it: inanimate objects, organisms, 
humans and societies. Education, for Aristotle, had the primary goal to teach virtue to 
the citizens.4 But, depending on the type of citizens envisaged, the type of virtue 
changes; therefore, the education should change as well. The definition of virtuous 
character changed through the ages and so did the content of humanistic curricula, so as 
to reflect the contemporary notions of the desirable character. But what constituted the 
best character remained linked with what was considered desirable to find in the persons 
living in the state.  
 
Following Aristotle’s reasoning, one cannot educate any subject in the same way, 
                                                          
4 Richard Stalley, “Education and the State,” in Anagnostopoulos, A Companion to Aristotle, 574. 
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because the difference in the purpose of education. There are two types of pupils or 
receivers of education in the Aristotelian polis: the good man (anér agathós) and the 
virtuous citizen (spoudaíos polítes). The good man is endowed with complete virtue, or 
excellence, while the citizens only have an incomplete virtue, Aristotle claims. After 
comparing the different functions of the people in a state with the different tasks of the 
types of sailors on a boat, Aristotle concludes that different types of constitutions 
require different types of virtues from their people:  
"in the same way, then, the citizens too, even though they are dissimilar, have the 
safety of the community as their task. But the community is the constitution. 
Hence the virtue of a citizen must be suited to his constitution. Consequently, if 
indeed there are several kinds of constitution, it is clear that there cannot be a 
single virtue that is the virtue - the complete virtue - of a good citizen."5 
 
The good man has only one type of virtue, the moral virtue (or excellence), and needs 
only one type of education because, presumably, this perfect virtue is the same 
everywhere. "The good man, we say, does express a single virtue: the complete one. 
Evidently, then, it is possible for someone to be a good citizen without having acquired 
the virtue expressed by a good man."6 In the perfect state, moral virtue is identical with 
civic virtue: here, the good citizen and the good man is the same individual. In the 
imperfect states there is no full moral virtue, but civic virtue would still be achievable 
for Aristotle. And civic virtue will vary with the type of constitution we are dealing 
with.  
 
As pointed out by Zhu, the political purpose of education is linked only with training of 
the character:  
"All statesmen and law-makers must 'take civic virtue and vice (aretès kíi kakías 
politikés) into their purview', and design their educational programmes primarily 
to train the character (ethos) instead of the intellect (dianoia) of their citizens. For 
what defines a man is his reason, whereas what defines a citizen is his free and 
independent spirit."7 
The citizen with an incomplete virtues is different from the good man. The citizens 
living in imperfect cities need to serve different purposes in different political regimes, 
so they will necessarily be trained for cultivating different forms of civic virtues: "For 
since there are several constitutions, there must also be several kinds of citizens, 
                                                          
5 Aristotle, Politics (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1998), Translated by C. D. C. Reeve, §§ Pol. 
III.4, 1276b25-30. 
6 Ibid., §§ Pol. III.4, 1276b30. 
7 R. Zhu, “Distinguishing the Public from the Private: Aristotle’s Solution to Plato’s Paradox,” 
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particularly of citizens who are being ruled."8 As the virtues (and vices) differ from city 
to city and function to function, education must be necessarily adjusted to these local 
goals. Different political systems require different types of ‘character building’ through 
education: "the virtue of a citizen in a democracy protects the democracy, of a citizen in 
an oligarchy protects the oligarchy, and so on, and that the activities involved in so 
doing are sufficiently different that they constitute the exercise of distinct virtues."9 As 
an example, civic virtue should include obedience of the law which implies learning 
how to be ruled, but especially in democracy, virtuous citizenship means: "a good 
citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to be ruled and to rule, and this is the 
virtue of a citizen, to know the rule of free people from both sides."10 
 
Depending on the type of persons that we want to cultivate as the outcome of the 
educational system, free individuals or obedient citizens, the curricula will change. The 
virtuous citizen needs a different type of education than that of the good man, such as 
the study of laws which will lead to obedience for the local constitution, because his 
highest duty is "safeguarding the community."11 Virtuous citizens do not challenge their 
laws, but strive to keep them unchanged: "Being a good citizen is aiming at the 
preservation of the constitution, which is presumably worth doing because it serves the 
common good. The common good being served may well not be the ideal good; being a 
good citizen may not amount to making a successful contribution to the complete virtue 
and happiness of all the citizens of a city."12 
 
Regardless whether nowadays we would agree with all of Aristotle’s assumptions about 
what it means to be a good citizen, the lesson to keep in mind is that his distinction 
between incomplete and complete virtue that operates on the basis of the criterion that 
establishes the subjectivity of education still is of interest today. It should be clear that 
educating someone for a certain skill will require a different type of education than the 
education one would wish to implement for educating the autonomous person, i.e. what 
Aristotle calls ‘the good man’. If the outcomes are to be different, i.e. the intended 
                                                                                                                                                                          
History of Political Thought. 25, no. 2 (2004): 237. 
8 Aristotle, Politics, §§ Pol. III.5, 1278a10-15. 
9 Jean Roberts, “Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual,” in Anagnostopoulos, A 
Companion to Aristotle, 557–58. 
10 Aristotle, Politics, §§ Pol. III.4, 1277b 10-15. 
11 Jean Roberts, “Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual,” in Anagnostopoulos, A 
Companion to Aristotle, 557. 
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subjects of education differ, so need to be the process bringing out these outcomes. 
There is a functional correlation between the education chosen and the type of character, 
therefore the type of person that it will mould. 
 
This distinction also helps us understand why the political intrusion in university 
curricula is deemed legitimate or illegitimate. It all turns on answering the question: 
‘whom are we educating?’ If it is citizens that are supposed to contribute to the common 
good of their country, then politicians might perhaps be entitled to ask for certain 
changes in the curricula. If the subject of education is the free-thinking, rational 
individual, then politicians may have no business to do in educational matters. It is of 
course possible that in the same historical period different parties have conflicting ideas 
about whom should be educated.  
 
However, the question ‘whom are we educating?’ has not been the focus of the 
literature surveyed so far. Instead, the contemporary arguments for political intervention 
in the university curricula revolved around the economic necessity of this intervention, 
traced back to the concept of a ‘knowledge economy’ and to the policy area ‘Europe of 
Knowledge’.  
 
Before showing how the question ‘whom are we educating?’ is being answered by 
contemporary educational policies, first we need to understand how and why political 
change in university curricula is cast as an economical necessity, rather than a choice 
from which a specific answer to the question ‘whom are we educating?’ is being 
offered. In order to do so two clarifications need to be made. First, a word about the 
nexus between knowledge and the economy is needed to provide orientation in today’s 
policy jargon. Second, an explanation must be given concerning how different types of 
knowledge are cast in relation to potential economic innovation. Both are discussed in 
the following note. 
 
A Terminological Note: The Various Senses of ‘Knowledge’ 
 
Both in the Bologna documents and the literature that reviews these, the educational 
                                                                                                                                                                          
12 Ibid., 564. 
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reform brought on by the Bologna Process is traced by most authors to the previous 
emergence of the policy area ‘Europe of Knowledge’. The Bologna Process is cast as 
the necessary reform in order to achieve some of the goals previously stated in the 
‘Europe of Knowledge’ statements: 
"A Europe of Knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor for 
social and human growth and as an indispensable component to consolidate and 
enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the necessary 
competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an 
awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural 
space."13 
Launched in the 1997, when the European Commission issued the communication 
entitled Towards a Europe of Knowledge, the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ represents the EU 
attempt to transition successfully to the knowledge economy which is seen as imminent 
and unavoidable. In the debates about the policy area ‘Europe of Knowledge’, three 
buzz-words regularly appear: "knowledge economy", "knowledge society" and 
"learning society" - these need to be distinguished because, even if these all employ the 
word ‘knowledge’, the usage is different. 
 
‘Knowledge economy’ is a concept mainly used by economists. It was popularised by a 
1996 OECD document entitled The Knowledge-Based Economy which defined 
knowledge-based economies as "economies which are directly based on the production, 
distribution and use of knowledge and information."14 This type of economies are often 
associated with investments in highly technological industries and the use of 
highly-skilled labour. At the centre of this type of economy is the knowledge embedded 
in the ‘human capital’, where ‘human capital’ represents the "productive capacity of 
human beings" and is, according to the definition offered by economist Ted Schultz, 
more valuable for the labour output than other forms of wealth.15 Instances of 
productive capacity include diverse ways of creating economic wealth such as: 
"schooling, a computer training course, expenditures on medical care, and lectures on 
the virtues of punctuality and honesty"16 because these not only increase work 
                                                          
13 European Ministers of Education, The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999: Joint Declaration 
of the European Ministers of Education Convened in Bologna on the 19th of June 1999 (Bologna, 1999), 
accessed November 23, 2013, http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/bologna_declaration.pdf 
14 OECD, The Knowledge-Based Economy: OCDE/GD(96)102 (Paris, 1996), 7. 
15 Theodore W. Schultz, “Investment in Human Capital,” The American Economic Review 51, no. 1 
(1961): 2, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1818907 
16 Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
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efficiency directly, but also indirectly through enhancing life-quality. 
The sociological term ‘knowledge society’ refers to "a society where activities and 
decisions across all domains of life are based on knowledge; a society, where research, 
focused on the discovery, acquisition, utilisation, and dissemination of knowledge is in 
harmony with education."17 This concept - as it appears in policy papers - is defined as 
a political ideal - "an objective towards which both, nation states, regions (e.g. the EU) 
and the global community (as defined by UNESCO) should aim."18 For example 
according to the Lisbon agenda, which was a plan of development for the EU 
established in 2000 and revised in 2005, the EU set for itself the goal "to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion."19 
 
The term "learning society" used to mean a society where the informal education was 
just as important as the formal one; but nowadays the term usually refers to a society 
whose members are engaged in life-long learning activities.20 This type of society is 
also presented in official EU legal and policy documents as a political ideal, a future 
normative goal towards we should aspire. "The society of the future will therefore be a 
learning society."21  
 
The three concepts have in common of the usage of the word ‘knowledge,’ but the 
meaning of ‘knowledge’ differs in the three instances. This difference is based on the 
seminal distinction between theory and praxis. This distinction will play an important 
role further in the thesis, therefore it is necessary to take a step back and look at the 
philosophical roots of the distinction between theory and praxis that can be found in 
Aristotle’s writings. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Education, 3rd ed (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 15–16. 
17 Bob Jessop, “A Cultural Political Economy of Competitiveness and Its Implications for Higher 
Education,” in Jessop; Fairclough; Wodak, Education and the Knowledge Based Economy in Europe, 13. 
18 Jussi Välimaa and David Hoffman, “Knowledge Society Discourse and Higher Education,” 
Higher Education 56, no. 3 (2008): 266. 
19 see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm 
20 Ibid., 269. 
21 Commission of the European Communities, “White Paper: education and training: teaching and 
learning: towards the learning society,” 1995, 2, accessed April 2, 2014, 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com95_590_en.pdf 
 14 
Following in the footsteps of Aristotle, who identified three main types of knowledge, 
we can speak of episteme, techne and phronêsis. Episteme, sometimes narrowed down 
as scientific knowledge, represents what we know about the world and its structure. A 
central philosophical concept, episteme has been reconfigured several times in the 
history of philosophy, from knowledge about the world to knowledge about the 
knowledgeable subject, to knowledge as a consensus constructed by a scientific 
community, to a paradigm prevalent in a certain moment of scientific development. 
"Epistemic knowledge is universal, certain, eternal, general, non-contextual and abstract 
and can be assessed from the criteria true–false."22 
 
Techne, also known as technical knowledge, art or craft,23 represents the human ability 
to solve certain problems, manufacturing products; it is knowledge with a specific 
purpose, therefore it is said to be instrumental.24 "Techne is more than a competence, as 
it both consists of an ability to carry out a procedure in practice in the form of a ‘coping 
skill’ and to give an account of the general laws and principles behind the procedure."25 
 
Finally, phronêsis (wisdom or practical reason) represents moral or social knowledge, 
awareness of the norms and values that gives us the ability to interact socially.26 
"Phronêsis is the practical knowledge of ethical, social and political life. Aristotle 
understands phronêsis as a kind of action competence with a true understanding of 
what is good/for the best for man. It is an ability to act morally correctly on the 
basis of the correct deliberations. The knowledge of phronêsis is a part of the 
virtuous human’s character."27  
 
"But prudence is concerned with the human things and with those about which it 
is possible to deliberate. [...] And prudence is not concerned with the universals 
alone but must also be acquainted with the particulars: it is bound up with action, 
and action concerns the particulars."28 
                                                          
22 Tone Saugstad, “Educational Theory and Practice in an Aristotelian Perspective,” Scandinavian 
Journal of Educational Research 46, no. 4 (2002): 379. 
23 Richard Parry, “Episteme and Techne,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2008 (2008) 
24 Bernt Gustavsson, “What do We Mean by Lifelong Learning and Knowledge?,” International 
Journal of Lifelong Education 21, no. 1 (2002): 20. 
25 Saugstad, “Educational Theory and Practice in an Aristotelian Perspective,” 380. 
26 Parry, “Episteme and Techne” 
27 Saugstad, “Educational Theory and Practice in an Aristotelian Perspective,” 381. 
28 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 
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The turn towards a service-based economy has changed the way the term "knowledge" 
is used in official discourse by policy makers and in the public sphere. Gustavsson 
notices that before the 1980s, ‘knowledge’ had a humanistic meaning, as it was linked 
to education, responsible citizens, and social welfare, while currently these connections 
have been replaced by economic terms such as: "‘efficiency’, ‘quality’, ‘competence’, 
‘goal-direction’ and ‘evaluation’."29 Thus, when speaking about "knowledge" in the 
context of ‘knowledge economy’, authors will most likely refer to one of these two 
meanings: either innovation (theoretical knowledge with a market value that brings 
something new)30 or techne (technical knowledge instrumental for getting that value 
out of the new ideas). Episteme as research will be acknowledged as an indirect source 
for innovation and is discussed mostly in contexts about university based research, but 
can also be linked to research and development divisions in corporations. 
 
For the knowledge economy only episteme and techne will effectively matter, as 
episteme is the expert knowledge embedded in the mass of scientists and researchers 
whose work could lead to patents and useful inventions, while techne is embedded in 
the mass of educated workers who need to be able to work in the new technological 
fields discovered by scientists. Techne is the means through which episteme can be used 
for society’s benefit. This is best referred to by a fourth term which did not exist in 
Aristotle’s times, but is essential in the knowledge economy, namely ‘innovation’. 
While scientific knowledge does not immediately render itself to marketable outcomes, 
‘innovation’ is the current name given to the process that aims to turn episteme into 
something profitable, effectively creating market value. 
 
Structure of the MA Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into three chapters. In chapter one we briefly sum up some of the 
major arguments in favour of humanities advanced before the Bologna Process. Taking 
into account that ‘humanities’ is in itself a contested concept, we offer first a working 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Translated by Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, §§ Nicomachean Ethics VI.7, 1141b10-15. 
29 Gustavsson, “What do We Mean by Lifelong Learning and Knowledge?” 14. 
30 Innovation has been defined as "The process of translating an idea or invention into a good or 
service that creates value or for which customers will pay." Source: Business dictionary found at: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/innovation.html 
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definition of humanities as the broad range of studies, methodologically different and 
substantially contiguous in its study of ‘Man’. This definition is neutral enough (it does 
not to assume what it means to be human or what traits need to be cultivated through 
humanistic education) so as to take into account the major topoi that have emerged in 
history about the ‘subject of education’: (i) Thus, in order, we shall revise the arguments 
in favour of humanities as ‘character building’ for the social elites - a set of arguments 
developed during the Renaissance; (ii) then we look at how such arguments changed by 
dwelling on the idea of Bildung and the Humboldtian arguments in favour of 
humanities; (iii) and point out how these arguments were challenged by postmodernists 
who thought of the political mission of the university in reconfigured terms. This first 
chapter will give an overview of the major historical figures of the subject of education: 
the social elites, the Enlightened yet disembodied Man of Reason; the embodied 
post-modern subject. 
 
In chapter two we describe what the Bologna Process is, outline a brief history of it, and 
analyse the texts of the Bologna ministerial declarations looking for clues in order to 
understand who is the educational subject according to the Bologna Process. We shall 
show that the answer to the question ‘who is being educated?’ that emerges from the 
analysis of the documents founding the Bologna Process is quite different from 
previous answers outlined in chapter one. Who is being educated? It is the European 
citizen as a mobile and employable citizen. 
 
In the third chapter we describe and analyse two types of arguments in favour of the 
humanities that take into account the new requirements for ‘usefulness’ of education. 
The first one concerns the general usefulness of academic research, as the disinterested 
pursuit of knowledge may lead to innovation and therefore unpredictable social 
usefulness. The second type of argument concerns the potential of humanities to 
educate people into dissenting democratic citizens. Both arguments have certain 
problems, as we shall see. In the conclusion we sum up the major findings of the paper 
and will re-cast the idea of ‘the usefulness of humanities’ from the perspective of the 
guiding question: ‘who is being educated?’ 
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Chapter 1. Educating the Few: Humanities before Bologna 
 
1.1 A Preliminary Definition of the Humanities as the General Study of 'Man' 
 
The term ‘humanities’ has a long history which originates in the Italian Renaissance: 
‘studia humanitatis’ was understood as "a course of instruction or self-study based on 
the classical literature of Greco-Roman Antiquity."31 The term ‘studia humanitatis’ was 
first popularised by a pupil of Petrarch, Coluccio Salutati (1331 - 1406), after having 
discovered it in a discourse by Cicero entitled Pro Archia. In Cicero’s discourse, the 
studia humanitatis was understood as the sum of studies intended to shape the young 
boys towards humanity.32 Salutati borrowed from Cicero the idea that language was the 
essential trait of humans when compared to animals, therefore Salutati included in the 
studia humanitatis the disciplines centred on language: grammar, rhetoric, poetics, 
history and moral philosophy.33 
 
Petrus Paulus Vergerius (1349-1420) and Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444) were the first 
Renaissance authors to extensively describe the studia humanitatis as a contemporary 
curricula. Thus, for Vergerius, humanities were identified with the liberal arts, and were 
meant to "attain and practice virtue and wisdom."34 Vergerius proposed as a basic 
curriculum for liberal arts "ancient history, moral philosophy, and eloquence 
(rhetoric)."35 For Leonardo Bruni studia humanitatis meant a curricula based entirely 
on classical Greek poets, orators, historians and moral philosophers, while leaving out 
logic, metaphysics, mathematics and natural philosophy. This curricula was designed 
explicitly as an alternative to what was being taught at that time in the universities, 
especially to the scholastic method of learning.36 Both Vergerius and Bruni conceived 
of humanities as linked with a practical purpose, that of encouraging "moral 
development and self-cultivation."37 
                                                          
31 Cristopher J. Lucas, “Studia Humanitatis,” in Philosophy of Education: An Encyclopedia, ed. J. 
J. Chambliss (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 630–32, 630. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Rens Bod, A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from 
Antiquity to the Present (Oxford University Press, 2014), 145. 
34 Lucas, “Studia Humanitatis” 630. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 631. 
37 Ibid., 630. 
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The first Italian schools that focused on humanities (Casa Giocosa, opened in 1423, and 
later Guarino Guarini's school in Ferrara) were famous and attracted many students, 
some of them foreigners, rivalling with the contemporary universities which practised 
the old scholastic methods.38 We see thus that from the very beginning, the humanities 
were designed in opposition to traditional modes of teaching, cast as a potentially 
revolutionary method. Christopher Lucas points out that by the end of the 14th century 
humanities came to symbolise a "cultural revolution, a protest against medieval 
formalism and intellectual aridity."39  
 
In the 15th century humanities lost some of their revolutionary appeal after being 
incorporated in the main university curricula, and since then have become inextricably 
linked with the institution of the university. Humanities in the 16th century were already 
thought of as great career path-makers for public service because those who studied the 
lives of Roman statesmen, many believed, would acquire "practical wisdom or 
prudentia" which would later enable them to become good public servants.40 Thus the 
self-cultivation and moral enhancement of the Italian Renaissance humanities student 
was put to use in order to form good public servants out of young rich men who would 
be later useful for the public good of the State.41 
 
By the 18th century humanities based on classical texts were already considered arid and 
useless displays of erudition by the French Encyclopédistes, as seen for example in 
Diderot ‘s Preliminary Discourse, or in the article about ‘College education’ in the 
Encyclopédie.42 Indeed, the risk of the erudite autoreferentiality and hence uselessness 
has been a constant risk accompanying the very idea of "humanities". The risk of 
confusing erudition and wisdom has never been overcome and it continues to haunt the 
contemporary debate.  
                                                          
38 Ibid., 631. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Edward Hundert, “D'Alembert's Dream and the Utility of the Humanities,” Critical Review 15, 
3-4 (2003): 462. 
42 "a young man, if he has spent his time wisely, leaves the college after ten years—among the 
most precious years of his life—with a very imperfect knowledge of a dead language and with precepts of 
rhetoric and principles of philosophy which he should endeavor to forget;" Jean R. D'Alembert and 
Edme-François Mallet, “College [abridged]: The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert,” (1753) 2003; 
Translated by Nelly S. Hoyt and Thomas Cassirer. Collaborative Translation Project, accessed July 31, 
2014, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.144 
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During the 19th century, in the German cultural space humanities received a central 
place in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s project for a free university and were promoted 
together with the concept of Bildung as the main ingredients in the education of 
autonomous men. At this time humanities were connected with their institutional 
dimension that is still the major home of humanities today: the university; or rather, the 
Humboldtian university, autonomous in the sense of freed from pressure of the State, 
the civil society and the market. This process of institutionalisation also pushed for a 
renewed reflection on the subject of education that humanities should focus on.  
 
Throughout history humanities have been designated by several names: studia 
humanitatis, liberal arts, human sciences, or Geisteswissenschaften (‘sciences of the 
spirit’). The plurality of names can be interpreted as showing the heterogeneous nature 
of the concept. As a contested concept, humanities have endured time and again crises 
of legitimation and identity. "Nothing seems to be more durable in the humanities than 
the crisis" said Martin von Spiewak.43 Two main sites of contestation for the concept of 
humanities can be easily identified: first, the very definition of humanities and its scope 
across disciplines; second, the political and, linked to this, the educational role of 
humanities. While this paper will dwell mostly with issues regarding the second 
problem, it is worth sketching briefly the issues around the definition of humanities. 
 
Humanities can be understood as a set of disciplines centred on the study of ‘man’ as 
opposed to natural sciences which study nature. This definition assumes a humanist 
outlook and a commitment to a particular understanding of what it means to be human, 
an emancipatory and individualistic perspective, tracing its roots to the philosophy of 
Pico della Mirandola in which "the conscious image of man, which is characteristic of 
the modern world, was born here: man exists in the act that constitutes him, he exists in 
the possibility of liberating himself."44 The emancipatory outlook was understood as 
liberating man from religion, and then from any other forms of authority. This definition 
was embraced by scholars especially after the Second World War because it provided 
their anti-totalitarian claims with a prestigious historical precedent. "By aligning their 
                                                          
43 "Nichts ist für die Geisteswissenschaften so beständig wie das Gerede von ihrer Krise." Source: 
http://www.zeit.de/campus/2007/02/geisteswissenschaften-pro 
44 Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance (Westport, 
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key terms with contemporary academic accounts of Renaissance humanism, the 
mid-century architects of the modern humanities could simultaneously claim a 
distinguished intellectual pedigree while making the humanities urgently relevant to a 
world in turmoil."45 
 
This definition of humanities as the study of the ‘humanity’ as an essential trait projects 
onto Renaissance a modern view of humanity which was a relatively recent invention, 
argues Paul O. Kristeller. Nowadays it is hard to argue for the unity of history, literature 
or philosophy, based on a shared vision of what it means to be human. Furthermore, the 
study of what it means to be human is not the monopoly of humanities anymore, at least 
since the advent of social studies.46 
 
The second definition of humanities claims to go back to the real Renaissance roots of 
humanities. Paul O. Kristeller argues that the humanities were a set of educational 
practises united by a practical goal - to benefit humans - and method - the study of 
language and letters -, not by their object of study: 
"Humanists – that is, humanistae, the individuals who taught the studia 
humanitatis – were ‘professional rhetoricians’, and their goals were both idealistic 
and practical: to build students’ character through liberal learning (the meaning of 
paideia) and to prepare them for a world of massively expanded literacy and 
immense complexity, where the skills of communication, interpretation, and 
negotiation of practical ethical problems were of paramount importance."47 
As education and knowledge with a practical aim, the humanities in the Renaissance 
combined harmoniously the three types of knowledge: episteme, techne and phronêsis - 
briefly presented in the Introduction of this paper. The technical aspect of humanistic 
knowledge was fulfilled by the study of grammar and rhetoric. Nowadays, argues 
Jennifer Summit, humanities departments are divided along the episteme and techne 
line: philosophy, literature and history emphasise episteme, while communication 
studies and journalism the techne. However, during the Renaissance these were seen as 
"two sides of the same coin."48 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975, ©1965), 9. 
45 Jennifer Summit, “Renaissance Humanism and the Future of the Humanities,” Literature 
Compass 9, no. 10 (2012): 666. 
46 Ibid., 667. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 670. 
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The main purpose of the study of humanities was, from this perspective, the individual 
development which was to benefit society at large.  
"For these humanistae, liberal learning – particularly its core activities, rhetoric, 
reading, and reﬂection on classical texts – mediates the active and the 
contemplative lives. Such study did not withdraw from the world but contributed 
to it, by producing educated individuals whose virtuous activities brought learning 
to life."49 
 
This paper will employ a working definition of humanities as the broad range of studies, 
methodologically different and substantially contiguous in its study of ‘Man’ since it 
best sums up the connotations that the notion has developed historically and since it is 
sufficiently unspecified as to enable us to engage in the philosophical discussion about 
the subject of education, alas of who is to be “humanised”, without assuming that the 
subject of education needs to be found in any predefined institutional arena.  
 
During the 20th century the debates on the crisis of humanities gained momentum and 
became widespread in the academic circles. A milestone of this debate was Husserl’s 
Vienna Lecture from 1935 entitled "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man" in 
which Husserl blamed naturalism (or the positivist method) for "beheading philosophy" 
by estranging philosophers from the subjective perspective in their pursuit of objective 
facts.50 The legitimation of humanities has been contested on at least two grounds: 
epistemic and educational. The epistemic legitimacy crisis is related to delimiting a 
specific domain of inquiry for humanities. This delimitation can be done either 
negatively, as Wilhelm Dilthey had proposed, by allocating to humanities whatever 
domain of inquiry falls outside the scope of natural sciences, or methodologically, as 
suggested by Heinrich Rickert who defined the humanities method as idiographic, not 
resulting in generalisable laws.51  
 
The educational legitimacy crisis stems from the political and social ambitions of 
humanities, starting from the Renaissance, with the goal to shape the human character. 
                                                          
49 Ibid., 670–71. 
50 "There can, however, never be any improvement so long as an objectivism based on a 
naturalistic focusing on the environing world is not seen in all its naivete, until men recognize thoroughly 
the absurdity of the dualistic interpretation of the world, according to which nature and spirit are to be 
looked upon as realities in the same sense. In all seriousness my opinion is this: there never has nor ever 
will be an objective science of spirit, an objective theory of the soul." Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology 
and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), Translated by Quentin Lauer, 188. 
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This paper will be concerned only with the attempts to legitimise humanities as 
educational disciplines and leave aside the epistemological debate. The educational 
ideal has been contested because, as times changed, so did the ideals of the character 
that were to be educated, which in turn implied a change in the humanities curricula. It 
is still a matter of debate which disciplines can be included in the ‘real humanities’ and 
which, if any, are the impostors.52 No matter what position one assumes in these 
debates, the fact that remains is that, if ‘humanities’ are concerned with training 
“Man’s” character, then the question is: whose character is that exactly? 
 
1.2 Humanities for the Social ‘Elites’ 
 
Chronologically, the first intended audience for the humanistic education were the 
political and administrative elites such as notaries, secretaries, clerks. In Renaissance 
Italy, becoming a loyal public servants was linked to a humanistic education, but only a 
few wealthy families had the access to that kind of jobs and education. From the 
beginning humanities were linked with social privilege. Yet the elitism was in the end 
for the good of the city, as humanities build character, the administrative elite needed 
training in the humanities because it was assumed that good leaders would benefit 
everybody. "These studies were deemed foundational for adolescent males from good 
families who aimed to pursue the active life of the citizen or subject in the service of the 
state."53 
 
The elites needed not study for a profession, but for leadership. This idea has its roots in 
the Aristotelian distinction between the life of leisure and the banausic occupations like 
crafts: 
"’Banausic’ occupations, such as practicing a craft, may distort the natural 
development of mind or body, while working for a wage is seen as a form of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
51 Andrea Staiti, “Heinrich Rickert,” in Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
52 Cultural studies have been named by some authors the ‘new humanities’ while others see them 
as usurping the name. For example, the ISCED classification from 2011 enumerated as humanities: 
"Religion and theology; Foreign languages and cultures: living or ‘dead’ languages and their literature, 
area studies; Native languages: current or vernacular language and its literature; other humanities: 
interpretation and translation, linguistics, comparative literature, history, archaeology, philosophy, 
ethics." UNESCO Institute for Statistics, International Standard Classification of Education ISCED 2011 
(Montreal, 2012), http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Documents/isced-2011-en.pdf, 73 However, in 
the ISCED classification from 2013 which is now official, the languages and literature were separated 
from humanities. 
53 Hundert, “D'Alembert's Dream and the Utility of the Humanities” 462. 
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slavery. Because he is controlled by the demands of his employer the wage-earner 
is not free."54 
Aristotle had thought that education should prepare students for the life of leisure, 
which was a state worthy of attaining in itself, because it leads to a good life:  
"That children should be taught those useful things that are really necessary, 
however, is not unclear. But it is evident that they should not be taught all of them, 
since there is a difference between the tasks of the free and those of the unfree, 
and that they should share only in such useful things as will not turn them into 
vulgar craftsmen. (Any task, craft, or branch of learning should be considered 
vulgar if it renders the body or mind of free people useless for the practices and 
activities of virtue. That is why the crafts that put the body into a worse condition 
and work done for wages are called vulgar; for they debase the mind and deprive 
it of LEISURE. [...] Leisured activity is itself held to involve pleasure, happiness, 
and living blessedly. This is not available to those who are working, however, but 
only to those who are engaged in leisured activity."55 
However, the Renaissance model of humanities wanted to close the gap between a life 
of leisure and a life of work, by combining episteme and techne in the study of 
humanities: 
"This synergy of knowledge and skill extends to the humanist ideal of a life that 
balances ‘‘virtue and wisdom,’’ the highest products of practical and theoretical 
knowledge. For Vergerio, these are brought together through ‘‘liberal studies’’ 
(14), which promote the ‘‘two kinds of life beﬁtting a free man, one consisting 
entirely in leisure and contemplation, the other in action and business’’ (19). 
Students of the studia humanitatis were exhorted to see themselves as both 
citizens and philosophers, resolving an ancient conﬂict in the well-lived life 
(Kimball). Thus Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini could assert: ‘‘For those men alone 
are perfect who strive to mingle political roles with philosophy and who procure 
for themselves a double good: their lives are devoted to the general beneﬁt, and, 
exposed to no disturbances, are spent with the greatest tranquility in the pursuit of 
philosophy’’ (Kallendorf 66)."56 
The three types of knowledge were combined harmoniously in the Renaissance studia 
humanitatis, because the final goal of the studies was achieving prudence, or phronêsis: 
"This, then, is the fruit of all studies; this is the goal. Having acquired our knowledge, 
we must turn it to usefulness, and employ it for the common good."57 
 
The idea of humanities as form fit of education for the elites has survived until our days, 
even though it stopped being the main source of legitimation. Sociological studies from 
France and the UK can be brought as examples of the survival of this practice. 
                                                          
54 Richard Stalley, “Education and the State,” in Anagnostopoulos, A Companion to Aristotle, 569. 
55 Aristotle, Politics, §§ Pol. VIII.3, 1137b10-1138a5. 
56 Summit 670–71. 
57 Jan L. Vives, “On Education (De tradendis disciplinis): Translated by Foster Watson,” 
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In France the higher education system was and still is formed of two parts: the classical 
universities (which might have an old tradition or be newly formed), and a system that 
ran in parallel with it, les grandes écoles, which trained students in commerce, 
administration or engineering, but also humanities.58 Both systems were formally 
considered universities, but had different social functions according to Pierre Bourdieu. 
Thus, the French university system was fundamentally split in two alongside the 
distinction university/grandes écoles: while universities accepted students from all 
social backgrounds and thus contributed to the massification of studies in France, les 
grandes écoles were highly selective in their admission process and effectively were 
training the future political and administrative elite of France.  
 
Bourdieu’s study has found out that throughout the 70s and 80s, the majority of political 
and administrative elites of France came only from the small group of Grandes écoles. 
The type of university one graduated predicted very well the social position in the 
future. The stratification of the higher education was partially an effect of May 1968, 
when the sons of the dominant classes fled the universities and relocated in the elitist 
grandes écoles where admission exam ensured exclusivity for those with cultural 
capital.  
 
Cultural capital consists of many aspects such as "verbal facility, general cultural 
awareness, information about the school system, and educational credentials."59 The 
people with more cultural capital are aware of the educational possibilities out there and 
know what is required of them in order to pass exams, write assignments, or speak in a 
certain way; these issues are alien to a first-generation student who has no cultural 
capital. While cultural capital is partially inherited from parents, it can also be bought 
with money, energy and time, and afterwards "exchanged for occupations with high 
status and incomes."60 For example the children of the rising middle class in France 
spent money, energy, and time on preparatory courses that were designed to help them 
pass the harsh entrance exams of the grandes écoles. The preparatory track focused on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
https://archive.org/details/vivesoneducation00viveuoft, 283. 
58 Guy Neave, “Patterns,” in A History of the University in Europe, ed. Walter Rüegg (Cambridge 
[etc.]: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31–72, 59. 
59 David Swartz, Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997), 198. 
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humanities because the exams consisted of essays and oral presentations that required a 
"mastery of linguistic style"61 which lacked in those without cultural capital. In order to 
gain entrance in the grandes écoles which later opened the way to leadership positions 
in the administration and politics, humanities were the first barrier. Being at home in 
humanities meant that one had cultural capital, and thus was worthy to be accepted in 
the elite-track university.  
 
A similar situation has been described in the UK by the sociologists Brown and Scase. 
Their study found that the education provided by the elite universities such as Oxford 
and Cambridge is emphatically non-useful and focused on the humanities, as a way to 
distinguish these universities from the universities frequented by the lower classes. The 
elitist and humanist type of education will ensure the access in the managerial and 
political elite of the UK.62 "By the start of the 20th century, it was virtually impossible 
to aspire to a senior position in the church, the public schools, the civil service or the 
law without having first been at Oxbridge."63 An example of a humanities programme 
marketed towards the elites is the Oxford based programme in Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics (PPE) which is the most sought after by future politicians: "The surest ticket 
to the top - for Conservative, Labour and Lib Dem politicians alike - is surely a degree 
in politics, philosophy and economics (PPE) at the University of Oxford."64 
 
The studies by Bourdieu, Brown and Scase construe this situation as unfair and elitist, 
because humanities are used merely to conserve the social status of the few privileged. 
However this negative characterisation can be explained by the lack of phronetic 
knowledge in the humanities education. Without character building, the humanities are 
just the means employed by a class to maintain its privilege, while the graduates cannot 
justify why they are the best candidates for political and administrative positions. 
 
The conception that the state or the Church needs to train the character through 
                                                                                                                                                                          
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 200. 
62 Phillip Brown and Richard Scase, Higher Education and Corporate Realities: Class, Culture, 
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64 John Kelly, “Why Does PPE Rule Britain?,” BBC News Magazine, accessed August 16, 2014, 
 26 
humanities was pervasive throughout history, and so the humanities were most of the 
times cast with an intrinsic political mission. Many times throughout history politicians 
saw the need to control humanities, as the humanities had a double potential: To incite 
revolution through their critical views on authority, but also to lead to golden path for 
entering the ruling classes. This conception changed however with the advent of the 
German Enlightenment when Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt argued for eliminating 
any political intrusion in the university curricula. This change was caused by the fact 
that Kant and Humboldt had in mind a different answer to the question who was being 
educated: For them it was the autonomous individual, not the previously loyal 
administrative elite. This answer led in its turn to a different type of argumentation for 
the humanities which was based on the concept of Bildung. We shall see in the next 
section how it unfolded. 
 
1.3 The Enlightenment Turn: Educating the Individual through Bildung 
 
Traditionally, higher education has been divided in two paths: The vocational or 
professional track which initiates the students into professions such as engineers, 
doctors, lawyers etc., and the theoretical track which has the purpose of creating a 
knowledgeable graduate by initiating the student into a certain culture (be it humanistic 
or scientific). There are two major figures in the Enlightenment who argued for Bildung 
as a necessary component of university education: Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 - 1835). While the idea of education as cultivating the 
virtues of the student goes back to ancient times, some would argue to Epicure, this idea 
became central in the justification of the need for a theoretical track through the works 
of Wilhelm von Humboldt who popularised the idea of Bildung in the 19th century. In 
the Humboldtian university training through pure science (Bildung durch Wissenschaft) 
was opposed to the mere professional training (Ausbildung) of the students. This 
training was, according to Ash "an approach to learning, an attitude of mind, a skill and 
a capacity to think rather than specialised knowledge."65  
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The meaning of Bildung is not clear-cut, which partially explains why many 
philosophers prefer to use the German word instead of translations. Bildung comes from 
the German verb bilden, which means to give shape or form, and it was initially defined 
in Latin as formatio,66 which implied that through Bildung the student will form his 
abilities and talents.67 Another possible linguistic source for the term Bildung is the 
noun Bild, which means image, so it implies that the formation of the student will 
follow an ideal image - this interpretation was put forth by Gadamer who thought that 
Bildung was a modern continuation of the Christian ideal of making the man become an 
image of God.68 
 
The most important interpretation of Bildung however is the one that gained popularity 
after Wilhelm von Humboldt became minister of education (1809-1810) and founded 
the University of Berlin (1810) based on his philosophy of education which had the 
concept of Bildung at the core. In Humboldt’s interpretation, Bildung was a rupture with 
the Christian tradition of education inherited from the Middle Ages, and a return to the 
classical ideal of ancient Greece. Scholars agree that the modern university which 
started in the Enlightenment represents a cultural shift from the scholastic university in 
the Middle Ages: "Rather than being the recipients of doctrinal truth, ‘‘fallible truth’’ 
could now be freely contested, debated and interpreted by students and scholars. And so 
the modern university values ‘‘humanism’’ by underlining the importance of ‘the 
individual, free will, and values.’"69 
 
For Humboldt, Bildung understood as ‘inward cultivation’ had an ultimate political 
purpose, that of achieving "political and social harmony" inside the state.70 In 
Humboldt’s interpretation, ancient Greek education was aimed at creating good citizens. 
Harmony in the city state was achieved not through political intervention in the private 
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life, but through a similar moulding of the citizens through education as paideia. 
"Because the polis sought ‘happiness in virtue,’ it promoted the harmonious 
development of the individual; in aiming to ‘train up temperate and energetic 
[kraftvolle] citizens,’ it gave a ‘higher impulse to their whole spirit and character.’"71 
 
Humboldt’s programme was to limit the power of the (contemporary) German state in 
order to increase the conditions for individual freedom, while still reaching the political 
goals of Enlightenment indirectly through education. The reason why he advocated for 
limiting State powers was that he viewed the contemporary German state incapable of 
achieving social harmony. Humboldt thought the state was too focused on "attending to 
man's well-being and his property, his ease and comfort"72 which led to obedient and 
productive citizens with no energy left for politics. The political goal of the German 
state was to have citizens that would service the state and Humboldt devised an 
educational politics that achieved this goal indirectly, through Bildung. "Humboldt 
argues that persons educated to be free individuals will ultimately be better citizens than 
men educated to be citizens, just as science left to its own devices will be more fruitful 
than science supervised by the state."73 
 
David Sorkin has reconstructed the three essential steps of the political and educational 
program of Humboldt: a) the financial responsibility for the schools was delegated to 
the State; b) "education should serve the person and not the citizen"74 which implied 
egalitarianism, because previously the education was meant to preserve hierarchies and 
social status, now it was open for everyone and this was supposed to facilitate social 
mobility; c) the curriculum of schools was based on general education (allgemeine 
Menschenbildung) composed of mathematics, classical languages and history; only after 
this curriculum was mastered, specialised training was possible.75 
 
It is important to notice here that humanities are cast again with a political purpose, just 
as in ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy, but this time the purpose is reached 
indirectly: First we need to educate the individual who in turn will want to serve the 
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public good with his abilities. Therefore the goal of education changed during German 
Enlightenment from educating the citizen to educating the individual. The Humboldtian 
philosophy of education, and especially the point about educating the person and not the 
citizen, is based partially on Jean Jacques Rousseau’s philosophy. From Rousseau 
Humboldt took the principle that the person is prior and more important than the 
citizen.76 For a stronger philosophical justification of why the individual is prior to the 
citizen and should be the goal of education, we need to turn back to Immanuel Kant, the 
main inspirer for Humboldt’s conception of Bildung.  
 
In Kant’s view, the main goal of education is to learn how to become free, or 
autonomous.  
"‘Practical’ or moral training is that which teaches a man how to live as a free 
being. (We call anything ‘practical’ which has reference to freedom.) This is the 
education of a personal character, of a free being, who is able to maintain himself, 
and to take his proper place in society, keeping at the same time a proper sense of 
his own individuality."77 
Individual autonomy plays a crucial role in Kantian practical philosophy as illustrated in 
his works Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical 
Reason (1788). Autonomy is understood as not being influenced by external factors 
when making a moral decision, taking decisions guided only by reason. In Kantian 
terms, autonomy is the ability to impose upon oneself the universal moral law and 
follow the guide of the moral law no matter how unpleasant or socially frowned the 
consequences might be. 
 
For Kant autonomy as moral self-legislation is something to be desired as an end in 
itself, but it will also help the society if more people were to be moral, i.e. 
self-legislating because they will see beyond their own egotistical interests.78 If an 
individual adopts the test of universability of the maxims and he asks himself each time 
what would happen if everybody would follow the same maxim, then he might not 
choose to act in accordance with his self-interest. A society where all citizens would 
follow their egotistical interest, like Hobbes had previously explained to be the natural 
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state of man, would be a society in which survival would be jeopardised. The rational 
outcome is that maximising one’s own self-interest will damage the society we live in, 
and ultimately ourselves. To pursue the common good is then the logical solution. 
Therefore, if citizens were educated to become rationally autonomous beings, they 
would reach the reasonable conclusion that they need to work together for the common 
good of the society. If people were educated for citizenship directly, then they would be 
forced to adhere to principles they do not understand, and ultimately their allegiance to 
the common good would be fake and fragile. It is therefore in the State’s best interest 
not to interfere in education and leave the students become free and independent 
thinkers which will ultimately be the best citizens for the State.  
 
Autonomy is reached by learning how to think critically on one’s own, and this is the 
main goal of Bildung: "The aim of education is not to drill the student in a set of skills 
as in the dressage of a horse, nor to train him in speciﬁc teachings and doctrines, but to 
enlighten him: The point is not to teach him what to think, but how to think."79 In this 
regard a curriculum that would include humanities is essential. Both Kant and 
Humboldt never argued against professional education, but thought of theoretical 
education as the main vehicle for Bildung and self-determination, as a prerequisite for 
the specialised education. 
 
We have seen that, during the German Enlightenment, the ideal of Bildung changed the 
recipient of education: The individual who needs to be educated into freedom, 
understood as critical thinking. Ultimately, the free individual will be useful to the State 
in some way that citizens drilled into obedience cannot. The inherent tension between 
individual and universal is somehow "brought to an inner harmony through Bildung."80 
Bildung continues to be a central concept in philosophy of education even after two 
centuries because for many scholars it gives legitimation to the educational practice.81 
If education were merely a way of transmission of knowledge, then the student would 
not need the professor, textbooks would suffice. But educators want to be more than 
mere informational sources and employ Bildung to prove that they are changing 
                                                          
79 Ibid. 
80 Nordenbo 350. 
81 Hans‐Christoph Koller, “Bildung and Radical Plurality: Towards a Redefinition of Bildung with 
Reference to J.‐F. Lyotard,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 35, no. 2 (2003): 155. 
 31 
students for the better because the teacher is also a role-model for the student; learning 
the virtue is done also by following personal examples, not just by the accumulation of 
knowledge. The assumptions behind Bildung are that individual autonomy is possible 
and desirable, that we can guide students into achieving the status of critical thinkers, 
and that the notions of autonomy and individuality are universal. These very 
assumptions were to be challenged by the postmodernist thinkers. 
 
Kant and Humboldt had answered that we need humanities because we need to educate 
men into freedom, emphasising that the goal was to educate individuals, not citizens, 
and the method to achieve this education was through Bildung. By criticising the 
concept of Bildung as a meta-narrative, the postmodernists have called into question the 
German Enlightenment-inspired answer and showed that the subject of education was 
neither universal nor free, and have instead proposed a new goal for education. 
Therefore in the next section I will outline the postmodernist challenge to the 
Humboldtian ideal of education (the autonomous individual) through the challenge of 
Bildung. 
 
1.4 Postmodernism and the Political Engagement of the Humanities 
 
By criticising the concept of Bildung, the postmodernists called into question the 
German Enlightenment-inspired answer to the question ‘who should we educate?’ and 
showed that the subject of education was neither universal nor free. It is important to 
understand the postmodernist criticism not only because it is one of the most important 
types of challenges faced by humanities in the 20th century, but also because it 
weakened humanities, leaving them in a vulnerable state for other future types of 
assaults. 
 
As a vast current of thought with multiple sub-currents, postmodernism is hard to define 
as a unitary philosophy. François Cusset in his book French theory:How Foucault, 
Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. transformed the intellectual life of the United States proposes a 
historical account of how postmodernism came to have an enduring influence on 
academic circles especially in the USA, and from there, it was transplanted back to 
Europe where it had not been too popular in the beginning. After the Second World War 
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many French intellectuals fled to the USA and gained a wide reputation by transforming 
the English literature departments into the central places of debate for issues that would 
have otherwise belonged to the philosophy or political science departments. By making 
claims about the centrality of the text and its interpretation as deconstruction, 
postmodernist thinkers managed to increase the importance of the literary studies inside 
academia and tried to reconquer a central role for humanities in the university after the 
ground had been lost during the 20th century.82 
 
In spite of the fact that the meaning of the term 'postmodernism' is contested, just like 
that of modernism,83 many authors agree that postmodernism, as an intellectual 
movement, can be broadly defined as a set of critical attitudes and practises which have 
in common the use of concepts such as "difference, repetition, the trace, the 
simulacrum, and hyperreality."84 These concepts - which previously would have been 
regarded as peripheral and unimportant - are now used to undermine several traditional 
concepts that previously held centre stage such as "presence, identity, historical 
progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning."85  
 
While the term ‘postmodernism’ began its philosophical career only in 1979, after 
Lyotard published his famous book The Postmodern Condition,86 the critical practises 
emphasised by postmodernism were employed before under the name of 
‘post-structuralism’ by authors such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles 
Deleuze or Julia Kristeva. There are broadly three phases in the development of 
postmodernism identified by Gerard Delanty as follows: First as an aesthetic movement 
in the arts, in the 1970s; second, as an epistemological thesis championed by Foucault 
(the so-called ‘post-structuralism’); third, as a theory of society and power relations, and 
a "political endorsement of multiculturalism" visible in the 1980s mostly in the USA.87 
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Lyotard identifies as the main feature of postmodernism the criticism of meta-narratives 
that are used to legitimise obsolete institutions such as the university or dominant 
paradigms such as metaphysical philosophy.88 Any major philosophy such as 
Kantianism, German idealism or Marxism implies or contains meta-narratives, but 
Lyotard will focus only on two meta-narratives: "The progressive emancipation of 
humanity – from Christian redemption to Marxist Utopia – and that of the triumph of 
science."89 For some authors postmodernism represents a sort of 
Counter-Enlightenment because of its fundamental anti-modern stance.90  
 
Knowledge, for the postmodernist thinkers, is not only emancipatory or liberating, but 
used to impose dominant meanings and to justify the power of the social institutions 
that govern the day:  
"If a metanarrative implying a philosophy of history is used to legitimate 
knowledge, questions are raised concerning the validity of the institutions 
governing the social bond: These must be legitimated as well. Thus justice is 
consigned to the grand narrative in the same way as truth."91  
Foucault would have agreed with Lyotard that knowledge is not merely an 
emancipating experience, yet he focused more on surveillance and disciplinary 
dispositifs, linked to knowledge.92 
 
Knowledge as a linear, unitary narrative is seen as oppressive because it excludes 
alternative meanings, hence the postmodernists asserted that there is no Truth, but 
truths, no knowledge, but knowledges, and no unity of the self.93 If the self is dissolved 
into multiple instances and roles, or "heterogeneous moments of subjectivity that do not 
cohere into an identity,"94 then it becomes hard to understand who is the subject of 
education that is being formed through Bildung, the main legitimation narrative of the 
humanities. The ‘end of man’ or the ‘death of the subject’ proclaimed by 
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postmodernists mean also the end of the possibility of Bildung, a topic explicitly 
attacked by Lyotard in his book The Postmodern Condition.  
 
Lyotard’s criticism of Bildung is two-fold. First he claims we should give up the idea 
that Bildung is a liberating practice. The postmodernists are highly suspicious of any 
discourse containing the words ‘freedom’, ‘emancipation’, ‘liberation’ etc. because 
these terms are taken not a descriptive of any given reality but as constitutive parts of a 
“narrative” developed in order to justify taking control of people’s lives: "The State 
resorts to the narrative of freedom every time it assumes direct control over the training 
of the "people," under the name of the "nation," in order to point them down the path of 
progress."95 
 
Second, Lyotard thinks that the knowledge pursuit is not disinterested; Bildung is not 
about "science for its own sake". There many conflicting interests at stake both in the 
teaching and research done in the humanities. He bases his claim on the words of 
Humboldt himself who had said that the science in the university should be oriented 
towards "the spiritual and moral training of the nation."96 There is then an inherent 
tension here between the social role of the University, to train moral individuals for the 
nation, and the disinterested purpose of science who seeks just the truth and cannot 
guarantee what it will find or how exactly these findings will influence people’s lives. 
Knowledge for knowledge’s own sake needs to remain open to serendipity, to 
unexpected findings, it cannot claim to know in advance what will be discovered. 
Lyotard argues that the nation, the State and even the whole of humanity do not care 
about "knowledge for knowledge’s sake." They finance universities only for building 
the character and legitimation of the nation.97 
 
Lyotard thinks that Bildung is simply not fit for the requirements of the modern age of 
education, although he is not endorsing in any way this new age.  
He notices that we live in an age of commodification of knowledge, in which 
universities have to come up with an efficient solution of transmitting this knowledge as 
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a product.98 The system of education, as part of the social system, has to produce only 
two types of skills: Those that enable the country to compete on a global market through 
its experts, and those skills necessary for "maintaining its internal cohesion."99 In this 
context, "[t]he old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the 
training (Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and will 
become ever more so."100 The skills needed for export and internal cohesion belong 
mostly to the graduates of the professional tracks, whom Lyotard calls the ‘professional 
intelligentsia’ and the ‘technical intelligentsia’.101 The education of the new 
intelligentsia employs mainly two methods: Simple reproduction and ‘enhanced 
reproduction’ which would include some "stimulation of imaginative minds."102 In this 
model of mere knowledge transmission however, the role of the professor has dawned 
and, together with it, Bildung becomes obsolete: "A professor is no more competent 
than memory bank networks in transmitting established knowledge, no more competent 
than interdisciplinary teams in imagining new moves or new games."103 
  
Lyotard argues that the conflict between knowledge and will has its roots in the Kantian 
philosophy. He translates this conflict in terms of a conflict between language games:  
"It is a conflict between a language game made of denotations answerable only to 
the criterion of truth, and a language game governing ethical, social, and political 
practice that necessarily involves decisions and obligations, in other words, 
utterances expected to be just rather than true and which in the final analysis lie 
outside the realm of scientific knowledge."104  
Bildung is situated thus at the intersection of two language games and needs to unify 
them, which Lyotard thinks is impossible. 
 
Delanty and Fuller argue that Lyotard's idea of a university as the place for political 
conservatism was inspired by the post-68 French government's reaction to student 
movements. As a member of the government commission that dealt with university 
reform after May 68, Lyotard had first-hand experience and understood that the new 
universities were created in France only as "the state's last desperate attempt at 
maintaining social order in a world that was quickly exceeding its control. In this 
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context, the appeal to academic standards was often a disguised reactionary ideology for 
arresting the cross-fertilisation of ideas and the novel developments they breed."105 For 
Lyotard: 
"The university was too much implicated in the control of society by the state. 
Thus Lyotard dismisses the entire neo-humanist tradition, such as Humboldt's 
vision of the integration of teaching and research.[...] For Lyotard, teaching has a 
counter-revolutionary function, while research can offer subversive 
possibilities."106  
Lyotard asks the question why do we need institutionalised knowledge? And why do we 
need the academic hierarchies to institutionalise this knowledge? He sees teaching as 
oppressive while research is subversive, so we need to decouple them. "Teaching is 
rejected as a meta-narrative and research must be released in the form of a plurality of 
little narratives."107 
 
Another point of rupture between the modern university and the Humboldtian model is 
the issue of university’s political engagement. The idea of a university independent of 
any political influence originated in the Enlightenment age and is historically linked 
with the humanities as a discipline defining the university. Kant was among the first to 
advocate for a university that would keep at least one faculty untainted by politics:  
"It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university also contain 
a faculty that is independent of the government’s command with regard to its 
teachings; one that having no commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, 
and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth: One in 
which reason is authorized to speak out publicly."108  
Yet it is hard to argue against state interference in university matters when the 
university itself, as a state-funded institution, is politically engaged in maintaining 
certain social structures. 
 
While Foucault never actually wrote about the university as an institution, some 
commentators109 have pointed out that the university is a political university following 
the Foucaultian logic that the most political institutions are those that do not dwell 
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explicitly with politics, but in places of hierarchical rule production and constraints, 
then obviously the university is an example of such a political place: "The real political 
task in a society such as ours is to criticise the working of institutions which appear to 
be both neutral and independent; violence which has always exercised itself obscurely 
through them will be unmasked, so that we can ﬁght fear."110 
 
Derrida claims that the university is implicitly a political institution because it favours a 
certain mode of thinking based on a hierarchical social structure that supports it. In the 
traditional dichotomy of reason vs. praxis, episteme vs. techne, professional vs. 
theoretical, the university has traditionally positioned itself on the theoretical side and 
conceived of its mission to pursue reason alone. Going back to Kant, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, Derrida finds evidence in all three authors for the following claim: "The 
essential feature of academic responsibility must not be professional education."111 
 
Taking as a starting point Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Derrida points out the "profound and 
hierarchizing political evaluation of Metaphysics"112 on which the university’s 
valuation of theoretical knowledge over applied or ‘professional’ is based. If theoretical 
knowledge (episteme) is superior to practical knowledge (techne) in Aristotle’s 
philosophy, then the man who employs episteme needs to be superior to the manual 
labourer, therefore he is cast in the role of a leader (architekton):  
"He commands- he is the premier or the prince- because he knows causes and 
principles, the "whys" and thus also the "wherefores" of things. Before the fact, 
and before anyone else, he answers to the principle of reason which is the first 
principle, the principle of principles."113 
Derrida’s next step is to identify the leader with the teacher, because the main role of 
the one who possesses knowledge is to impart it upon others, and this teaching position 
is socially superior and based on leisure: 
"Now this theoretician leader, this knower of causes who has no need of 
"practical" skill, is in essence a teacher. Beyond the fact of knowing causes and of 
possessing reason [to logon ekhein], he bears another mark [semeion] of 
recognition: the "capacity to teach" [to dunasthai didaskein]. To teach, then, and 
at the same time to direct, steer, organize the empirical work of the laborers. The 
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theoretician-teacher or "architect" is a leader because he is on the side of the 
arché, of beginning and commanding. "114 
Derrida’s conclusion is that the hierarchy of knowledge that puts episteme on top of 
techne needs a social structure to instantiate it and that implicitly the university endorses 
the social and political system that recognises its underlying values: "Desiring to 
remove the university from ‘useful’ programs and from professional ends, one may 
always, willingly or not, find oneself serving unrecognized ends, reconstituting powers 
of caste, class, or corporation."115 
 
We have seen so far that several postmodernists have unmasked the political 
engagement of the university incompatible with the Humboldtian model. Some 
postmodernist thinkers have embraced this political engagement and even pleaded for 
more social relevance of the curricula, especially in the humanities, by including the 
perspectives of the neglected (minorities, lower classes etc.). Next we shall look at 
cultural studies and post-colonial studies, the most controversial new disciplines that 
were created in the wake of postmodernism, in order to see how this political 
engagement is argued for. 
 
What has happened with humanities in academia after the postmodernist attack can be 
labelled as a radical transformation. The humanities nowadays are very different from 
the subjects taught in the 50s. Several attempts to re-name humanities have been made. 
The expression ‘new humanities’ was coined in 1991,116 and was meant to designate 
humanities without humanism, what was left after the denying of the humanist roots. 
Humanism’s main premise was that there is such a thing as a universal human nature 
and it needs to be studied through the study of culture. The postmodern humanities deny 
that a ‘universal human nature’ exists.117 
 
The new humanities have been partially identified with cultural studies and minority 
studies. Several authors see cultural studies as inhabiting and transforming their ‘host’ 
disciplines, the humanities.118 ‘Cultural studies’, as a denomination for a new way of 
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making humanities, was a term invented by Richard Hoggart in 1964 when he founded 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies institute in Birmingham. Cultural studies 
focus on previously ignored issues such as gender, ethnicity or post-colonialism,119 and 
usually want to bring to surface the peripheral perspectives of ‘the other.’ Cultural 
studies have become the dominant paradigm nowadays to such an extent that, in a new 
European university, the newly founded English departments are always called 
"department of communication, or of cultural or textual studies."120 
 
As a tentative definition, cultural studies constitute "an interdisciplinary study of all 
those cultural practices through which society makes sense of itself,"121 the key word 
being here ‘interdisciplinary.’ The new humanities have several distinctive features: 
These do not make a distinction between high and low culture (or between the ‘canon’ 
and the ‘popular’ culture), challenge old disciplines with new methods of study (usually 
‘critical theory’), and have an implicit, sometimes even explicit, political 
engagement.122 
 
 
We have seen that Kant and Humboldt had pleaded for the non-interference of the state 
in university life, some second generation postmodernists want a larger role for the 
university in society and politics. Ideally, if critical theory ideas were disseminated and 
the educated public would be aware of meta-narratives, then this should lead to a more 
responsible political life. However, this is not a direct consequence of the 
first-generation postmodernist thinkers, later postmodernist reinterpreted their thought 
in this direction.  
 
According to François Cusset, cultural studies, although originating from the UK, 
gained their real popularity in the USA during the 1980s. In the UK cultural studies 
were focused on mass culture as a way to understand battles for cultural hegemony 
between social classes. However, in the USA the focus was shifted towards 
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communities because social class did not matter so much in the USA.123 
 
"Whereas the British consider one or several cultures as an extension of a social 
battlefield, their American counterparts-who are more often trained in literary 
fields than in sociological or historical ones-attach greater importance to the rise 
of pop culture and its mass appeal as a new entity, whose social implications 
interest them less than the invention of specific codes and the ‘creativity’ of its 
recipients."124 
Together with cultural studies, minority studies and post-colonial studies boomed in the 
USA, focusing on the so-called politics of identity. After reading the main critical 
theorists which had mainly dealt with literary or textual studies, a political conclusion 
emerged: Objectivity was redefined as "subjectivity of the white male"125 and 
minorities were encouraged to make their voices heard in the classroom as well as the 
professors chose a more inclusive curriculum, with previously marginalised authors. 
 
This movement was not without its critics. For Bill Readings, this turn signals the death 
of culture as the guiding principle in the academia:  
"Cultural Studies, that is, arise when culture ceases to be the immanent principle 
in terms of which knowledge within the University is organized, and instead 
becomes one object among others. Women’s Studies, Gay and Lesbian Studies, 
and Postcolonial Studies arise when the abstract notion of “citizen” ceases to be 
an adequate and exhaustive description of the subject, when the apparent 
blankness and universality of the subject of the state is able to be perceived as the 
repository of privileged markers of maleness, heterosexuality, and whiteness."126 
 
But the culture is not the main purpose of university education anymore, argue Stanley 
Aronowitz and Henry Giroux, in their 1991 book about critical pedagogy, Postmodern 
education. They argue that, if culture is so embedded with power relations, these need 
to be unmasked and new alternatives proposed. Politics is a higher stake here than 
culture, for Aronowitz and Giroux.  
"For example, in an American literature class it would seem appropriate to use not 
only texts that have played major roles in shaping the history of American 
literature, but also those texts that have been ignored or suppressed because they 
have been written from an oppositional stance, or because they were authored by 
writers whose work is not legitimated by a dominant Eurocentric tradition. What 
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we are arguing for here is a deliberate attempt to decenter the American literature 
curriculum by allowing a number of voices to be read, heard, and used. This 
approach to reading and writing literature should be seen as part of a broader 
attempt to develop pedagogically a politics of difference that articulates with 
issues of race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexual preference from a position of 
empowerment rather than from a position of deficit and subordination."127 
So education is meant to empower and give a voice to previously oppressed minorities. 
They trace some of their concepts to Foucault and his concept of counter-memory 
which they interpret as "an attempt to rewrite the language of resistance in terms that 
connect human beings within forms of remembrance that dignify public life, while at 
the same time allowing people to speak from their particular histories and voices."128 
 
Other authors argue that the empowerment of minorities through education is however 
useless. François Cusset argues that the actual minorities had little contact with the 
academic life and their political struggles had less progressive but more urgent 
demands. The academic discourse about oppression was "simply not readable for the 
actual victims of sexual or ethnic oppression."129 From a Marxist perspective, reducing 
the political struggle to voice and discourse of difference meant that the only possible 
battle was that inside the academic world and that actual social movements were 
useless:  
"If signs are all that remain, and social prob­lems can be resolved in text, then the 
only possible political gesture is one of reappropriation, shifting meaning, and 
innovatively combining existing signs - which takes us far from the concrete 
historical forces on which Marxism is based."130 
Cusset argues that the real political battle ground was to fight against capitalism, but the 
critical theorists missed this opportunity.  
 
Cultural studies use a different valuing system to select what needs to be taught. The 
most common example is how English literature is currently taught. Before 
postmodernism, the texts to be taught and analysed were selected because they belonged 
to the so-called ‘canon.’ The canonical texts (usually including authors such as 
Shakespeare, Milton, Byron, etc.) were thought to be the apex of refined taste and 
perfection of language. But these texts, argue the postmodernists, were selected only 
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because these rendered a privileged perspective on society (the dominant classes, the 
white, the male, the heterosexual) which was normalised because no other competing 
perspective was present to challenge.131 Nowadays the texts selected for study are 
chosen based on their representativity of all marginalised perspectives, and for their 
political significance. 
 
Several critics of the postmodernist approach point out that this new practice is not 
really liberating, it is merely replacing an old hypocrisy with a new one, that of political 
correctness. On this interpretation, only minorities have voice in the curriculum, while 
previous privileged perspectives are now relegated to a minority position:  
"What they hope for is a kind of conformity to a set of "progressive" values and a 
consensus on a victimhood interpretation of history in general, and of modern 
America in particular. They do not want, for example, a representation of fascist, 
racist, Catholic, conservative, or other diverse opinions. Diversity is defined in 
terms of group representation, provided the groups are politically correct.[…] In 
other words, it doesn't count as multicultural if it is Irish or Jewish, because they 
are perceived as part of the dominant culture."132 
Critics like Searle point out that the previous purpose of the humanistic education was 
to liberate the individual from the "accidents of his or her upbringing" through the 
contact with the universal culture.133 Contrary to this, nowadays the celebrating of 
diversity essentialises the background of the student who is now identified with it:  
"[o]ur ideal originally was to emphasize the individual within the universal. Now 
neither the universal nor the individual is emphasized. Rather, you as an 
individual derive your identity not from your individual efforts at self-definition, 
but rather from the group to which you belong. And, consequently, you are 
representative of your group. You cannot escape having identity through ethnicity, 
by the way."134 
Once the critical theory was institutionalised in academia, this posed a problem for their 
status of counter-hegemonic criticism. Anne Chalard-Fillaudeau and Gérard Raulet are 
asking how can one criticise the state if one participates in its institutionally sanctioned 
ways of knowledge such as journals, publishing houses, research centres.135 
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Whether or not the critical thinking turn in education was a betrayal or a continuation of 
the original first-generation postmodernist thinkers is not the concern of this paper. It is 
important however to notice that postmodernism as a politically engaged philosophy 
pleaded for giving a voice for minorities and those previously excluded. In this sense 
postmodernism in humanities supports the view that education is for citizenship, but 
asks to redefine citizenship in a more inclusive way. However, this criticism of the old 
humanities is done from inside the academia, the debate stays confined to university and 
journals. Critical theory tried to change the educational system, but it did so by speaking 
from lecture halls or from journals to other academics. Humanities partially changed 
after embracing cultural studies, minority studies, identity politics discourse. But in the 
same institutions old departments of history, philosophy and literature continued to exist 
and debate in the same language, on the same level with the postmodernists. In the next 
chapter we shall see what a different kind of criticism was to come at the end of the 90s 
with the Bologna Process, an extra-academic criticism that was going to change the 
game in town. 
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Chapter 2. Educating the Many: The Bologna Process as Paradigm 
Change 
 
2.1 The Bologna Process: A Short Introduction 
 
A brief definition of what Bologna Process (BP) stands for would include the following 
aspects: It is a voluntary intergovernmental policy that aims to standardise study 
programmes and degrees136 in order to facilitate mobility of students and teaching staff; 
this policy is made through regular ministerial meetings - usually scheduled every two 
years: "The Bologna process refers to this intergovernmental arrangement of nearly all 
European countries, both EU and non-EU members, plus the European Commission, 
which meet more or less regularly to discuss the actions agreed upon."137 The initial 
goal of the process was to create a European Area of Higher Education by 2010 and 
now, once the EHEA has been created, to further expand this area. The EHEA is 
comprised of 46 European countries, not all of them members of the EU. The word 
‘Europe’ in the EHEA does not designate the continent Europe, nor the EU. The EHEA 
is roughly coincidental with the Council of Europe138 since the criterion for inclusion in 
the Bologna Process is the previous signing of the European Cultural Convention and 
all members of the Council of Europe have signed it. 
 
The Bologna lines of action have changed during the last 15 years, mostly by adding 
new goals to the previous ones or by shifting priorities. As of 2009 the latest goals for 
the next decade, as stated in the BFUG plan, were the following: "Social dimension: 
equitable access and completion; lifelong learning; employability; student-centred 
learning and the teaching mission of higher education; education, research and 
innovation; international openness; mobility; data collection; multidimensional 
transparency tools; funding."139 
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While the BP is an intergovernmental process, its effects take place simultaneously at 
three levels of governance: Supranational, national and university level, which makes it 
a complex and dynamic process.140 The main actors that play a part in it are the 46 
signatory countries which are not all members of the EU and the EU Commission. 
Other consultative members are the Council of Europe, UNESCO, European Centre for 
Higher Education, European University Association, European Association of 
Institutions in Higher Education, European Students' Union, European Association for 
Quality Assurance in Higher Education, Education International Pan-European 
Structure and BUSINESSEUROPE.141 
 
The BP uses the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as the main way to implement 
its policies. OMC is an intergovernmental method of so-called soft law in which the 
states agree on a line of action and then implement it under the surveillance of the 
Commission, but there are no sanctions in case of failure. The main force of OMC is the 
"peer pressure" that is generated by other member states. The OMC takes soft law 
measures "which are binding on the Member States in varying degrees but which never 
take the form of directives, regulations or decisions."142 
 
The OMC was an instrument introduced by the EU in 2000 at the Lisbon Summit and 
the initial purpose was to "designed to promote a European problem-solving approach 
in the field of employment" but, as Sabrina Regent has shown, since then it has 
expanded to other more sensitive policy areas which were previously of national 
competence such as "the fight against poverty and social exclusion, as well as pensions, 
immigration, education and youth issues."143 It is interesting to notice that the BP is 
using an instrument of soft-law designed and promoted by the EU, even though the 
BP includes non-EU members and it positions itself as an autonomous process from the 
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EU, while collaborating tightly with it.  
 
The OMC emphasises the voluntary nature of the steps agreed on by the participating 
countries. However, some authors claim that countries joined the BP because of the fear 
of being left out. "In the Bologna Process, several countries are policy-makers and most 
others are policy-takers. Even though most countries are policy-takers, there is 
willingness to be part of the Bologna Process since it is better to be part of the group 
than left out of the group, given the participation of most countries in Europe."144 This 
means that countries that do not comply may incur in social but not strictly speaking 
legal sanctions. According to Regent, OMC is an effective method of enforcement 
because it "provides a soft framework for hard law interventions and has its own 
methods of sanctioning. It is ﬂexible enough to be adapted to complex realities, but, at 
the same time, establishes a follow-up system that signiﬁcantly limits the scope for 
circumvention."145 
 
The lines of action are decided every two years by the ministerial conferences and then 
implemented by every country at its own pace. But since there is no permanent 
presidency or board to supervise the BP, the managing tasks are transferred each two 
years to the next country that organises the ministerial conference.  
"Its organizational basis, compared to the Commission on the one hand and the 
member states and other Bologna countries on the other, remains fragile. There is 
no permanent secretariat of any size or scale. Nor did the signatory states embark 
upon building up a (semi-) permanent administration with an executive capacity to 
support the pursuit of the process."146 
 
The BP was prepared by several historical precedents of European programmes aimed 
at promoting mobility for students and university staff. The first example is the Erasmus 
Programme (European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University 
Students) which was launched in 1987 with the support of the European Commission; 
its initial aim was to promote student and teacher mobility between European 
universities for at least a semester and maximum an academic year. Already from the 
launch of the programme, a practical problem arose: How to recognise the different 
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study programmes and transfer the grades acquired outside in the home university 
system? The 87/327/EEC Council decision recommended the use of ECTS (European 
Community Course Credit Transfer System) in the participating universities and 
allocated some funds for the universities willing to implement this system.  
 
The Erasmus Programme was very popular among students and soon the need for 
degree and course recognition among the participating universities grew stronger. In 
this context the Lisbon Recognition Convention was adopted in 1997. The Lisbon 
Convention was initiated by the Council of Europe and UNESCO and is signed by 55 
states up to date, some of which are not members of the Council of Europe. The Lisbon 
Convention provided the formal framework for joint degrees and inter-university 
programmes, and some authors stress that this is "the only legal document within the 
Bologna Process."147 In the same time there were several regional initiatives among EU 
states for promoting student and teacher mobility: "Nordplus (Nordic countries, 1988), 
Pushing Back the Borders (the Netherlands, Flemish Community of Belgium and three 
German Länder, 1991), Ceepus (Central European Exchange Programme for University 
Studies, 1993) etc."148 
 
Following the fall of the Berlin wall, the TEMPUS programme149 was launched in 1990 
in order to facilitate cooperation of Western European countries with the new 
neighbours from Eastern and Central Europe. TEMPUS was also a programme of 
mobility for students and teachers but with the specific aim to have East-West 
exchanges, rather than in any other direction. Its main purpose was to modernise the old 
Eastern educational systems and bring them up to date with the rest of Europe.  
 
Even though, in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, article 126 specifically excluded "any 
harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States"150 with regard to 
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education, thus leaving education again within the exclusive competence of the member 
states, at the same time the Maastricht Treaty called for the promotion of a "European 
dimension" in education and the "development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States"151 again through mobility and degree recognition. 
This could explain why the Bologna Process was developed as an intergovernmental 
policy area and not an EU policy area.  
 
The BP was created within the favourable circumstances of increasing mobility and 
gradual standardisation of academic degrees. In a way the first Bologna agreement did 
not add anything new or revolutionary to its historical precedents. However, if we relate 
it to the Maastricht Treaty, the BP looks like an extension to the Treaty because the 
Bologna Process started creating policies in an area where the EU had stopped abruptly. 
According to Guy Neave, "the EU member states that signed the [Bologna] Declaration 
were prepared to yield on the principle of harmonization, at least in an 
intergovernmental setting."152 
 
It is hard, in effect, to separate Bologna from other educational integration processes 
such as the Lisbon Process because reforms from one side are responding to policies 
relating to or originating within other processes; sometimes these policies "intersect, 
cross and meld."153 But one could say that the BP together with the Lisbon Recognition 
Convention, TEMPUS, and Erasmus Mundus form a conglomerate of programmes that 
strongly promote internationalisation of European higher education institutions through 
mobility.  
 
In this favourable internationalising context outlined above, the BP added its own 
interpretation of what it means to be an international university. Thus the BP focused 
mostly on student and staff mobility, and saw mobility as "a main tool of 
internationalisation."154. In the beginning the BP gave a mostly cultural reading of what 
it meant to internationalise, thus distancing itself from the economic or social aspects 
that were the focus of Lisbon 2000. Neave claims that because of this cultural focus, BP 
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was subordinating itself to the "central vision of Europe as a cultural entity."155 Only in 
2003, with the Berlin Communiqué, the BP included the economic dimension when 
referring to university’s role in the knowledge economy.156 This added complexity to 
the way the BP works. In the following section we shall see in more detail some of the 
BP mechanisms. 
 
2.2 The Bologna Communiqués 
 
On the 19th of June 1999, in Bologna, 29 European ministers of education gathered to 
sign the Bologna Declaration that was going to set in motion a process of educational 
reform throughout Europe, the so-called Bologna Process (BP). The declaration stated 
several general goals such as: Making the European higher education more competitive 
internationally, promoting mobility for students and teachers, co-operation in Quality 
Assurance and promoting a certain "European dimension in higher education". The 
specific steps outlined in the declaration were the following: 1) introduction of the 
diploma supplement as a way to recognise studies outside the national system; 2) 
division of university studies in two cycles, undergraduate and graduate; 3) 
implementing a system of credits that would facilitate student mobility.157 
 
This historical declaration was prepared by three previous meetings. In 1988 the 
University of Bologna was celebrating its 900th anniversary, making it effectively the 
oldest European university still functioning. On this occasion 388 vice-chancellors of 
universities from eighty countries signed the Magna Charta Universitatum Europaeum, 
a document in which they stated the need for creating stronger bonds and cooperation 
among European universities.158 In April 1997 the Council of Europe together with 
UNESCO elaborated the Lisbon Convention in which they established a legal 
framework for the recognition of studies among the signatory countries; 55 states have 
signed the Lisbon Convention until now.159 In May 1998 the four ministers of education 
from France, Germany, Italy and the UK issued the Sorbonne Declaration in Paris in 
which they called for further steps in the harmonisation of the European education, and 
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for the creation of a European Higher Education Area.  
  
These three previous steps led to the adoption of the Bologna Declaration in 1999 which 
was envisioned to be a long process, signposted every two years with meetings between 
the ministers of education and other stakeholders. These meetings usually resulted in 
official communiqués and declarations titled after their signing place: Communiqué of 
Prague in 2001, the Berlin Communiqué in 2003, Bergen Communiqué in 2005, London 
Communiqué in 2007, Leuven Communiqué in 2009, Budapest-Vienna Declaration in 
2010, and the Bucharest Communiqué in 2012. The following ministerial conference 
will take place in 2015, in Yerevan, Armenia. 
 
In almost each ministerial meeting the number of signatories increased and several new 
lines of action were added. In Prague, 2001, there were three new lines of action added 
to the previous six, while the European Commission received the "special status of an 
additional full member." Several structures were created such as a Bologna Follow Up 
Group (BFUG) with the task of supervising the implementation of the action plan 
during the years between the conferences, a Bologna Preparatory Group (BGP) which 
was in charge of preparing the next ministerial meeting, and a BFUG Board - all these 
structures grant only temporary membership, there is no one who is a permanent 
member of any structure.160 In 2003, in Berlin, three intermediate priorities were 
defined for the nine initial action lines: Quality assurance, the two-cycle degree system, 
and the recognition of degrees and periods of study; also a tenth action line concerning 
doctoral studies was added.161 For the first time, in London, in 2007, the goal of social 
inclusion was added and it was cast as a priority for the next two years together with 
increasing the student mobility. In Leuven, 2009, while reiterating the previously stated 
goals, the ministers stressed the need for student-centred learning outcomes. In 2010 the 
anniversary conference held in Vienna and Budapest celebrated the completion of the 
European Higher Education Area - which had been the initial goal in 1999. The future 
conferences were meant to strengthen and expand this area.162 
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The Bologna Process was a disruptive event for higher education in Europe. But in 
order to understand the changes that the process brought about, a look at how the policy 
was developed and what were its guiding principles is necessary. Starting from 1999, 
when the BP was initiated, ministers of education from the signatory countries together 
with several other consultative members meet every two years and issue a communiqué. 
The communiqués issued after each ministerial conference are the most appropriate case 
study for a textual analysis because these constitute the official position of the ministers, 
representing signatory countries, and give a relatively accurate picture of the evolution 
of the EHEA policy every two years. As pointed out by many authors, the BP is a 
"moving target"163 because new goals are added after each ministerial conference and 
some key terms are redefined or emphasised differently. The communiqués are not legal 
documents and look very much like press statements with the message ‘We, the 
ministers of education, want to reach these goals.’ Therefore, these documents are 
representative not of what actually is going on in the policy and implementation cycle, 
but of the aims and purposes that are supposed to guide the political and administrative 
action of implementing the policy. Sometimes, the communiqués also include short 
summaries of the results achieved so far, acknowledgements of the other stakeholders’ 
points of view and organisational statements about what will follow next. 
 
The analysis of the documents will be looking for the following themes: 1) what is the 
main mission of education in the EHEA vision; 2) what are the graduates supposed to 
become after their studies; 3) how are the students described. These three themes will 
help us outline an answer to the main question: Who is being educated in the Bologna 
Process? 
 
A Prehistory of the Bologna Process: Magna Charta and Sorbonne 
 
In 1988, with the occasion of the 900th anniversary of the University of Bologna, 380 
vice-Chancellors of European universities signed the Magna Charta Universitatum in 
which they reaffirmed the Humboldtian ideals of the university as an entity independent 
from political and ideological interventions, having as main role to produce culture and 
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independent research: "To meet the needs of the world around it, its research and 
teaching must be morally and intellectually independent of all political authority and 
intellectually independent of all political authority and economic power."164  
 
They also re-stated the Humboldtian principle of the inseparability of teaching from 
research: "Teaching and research in universities must be inseparable if their tuition is 
not to lag behind changing needs, the demands of society, and advances in scientific 
knowledge."165 The document states that universities have a duty to serve society, while 
the society needs to finance the universities because this is an investment in the very 
future of society. It is worth emphasising here that Magna Charta has a universalistic 
message, it mentions society in general, and does not concern itself with allegiances 
towards a certain state or region. The university should serve humankind in general. 
This is important to keep in mind because the future BP documents will have a strong 
focus on Europe, promoting a sort of regional patriotism. The "European humanist 
tradition" appears once in the text and is used to argue that the university vocation 
"transcends geographical and political frontiers"166 and therefore the objective of 
university education should be "universal knowledge." Education is conceived to fulfil a 
generational and cultural purpose: "Universities must give future generations education 
and training that will teach them, and through them others, to respect the great 
harmonies of their natural environment and of life itself."167 In order to achieve its 
purpose, the university needs autonomy conceived as: a) freedom to choose what it 
researches and teaches; b) freedom of recruiting its staff; c) freedom of students, and d) 
free exchange of information and documents among universities, also teacher and 
student exchanges.  
 
We must keep in mind that the Magna Charta was not signed by politicians, but by 
university vice-chancellors. The document does bring up the needs of the society, but 
these are addressed by activities that the university has always been doing, namely 
independent research and research-based teaching. The duty of the university towards 
society is construed as the mission to discover and disseminate knowledge; this mission, 
it is claimed, cannot be fulfilled unless society recognises the political autonomy of the 
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university. 
 
Ten years later, in 1998, the Sorbonne Declaration was signed by the four ministers of 
education from France, the UK, Germany and Italy. A radical change of discourse is 
already visible in this declaration. The document starts by mentioning the policy-area 
‘Europe of Knowledge’ and construes the mission of the university to be the following: 
To "strengthen and build upon the intellectual, cultural, social and technical dimensions 
of our continent."168 The Sorbonne declaration appears to be a narrow-scope document 
that aims to create a framework between the four countries in order to facilitate 
international mobility of students. However, its meaning is most obvious when read in 
parallel with the Commission’s Communication entitled Towards a Europe of 
Knowledge, issued one year earlier, in 1997, through which the policy area ‘Europe of 
Knowledge’ was launched.  
 
The Communication starts with a prevision about the future: As they are entering the 
‘knowledge society,’ this inevitable transition requires certain measures from the EU 
member countries. The focus of these measures is on education, research and 
innovation: 
"Real wealth creation will henceforth be linked to the production and 
dissemination of knowledge and will depend first and foremost on our efforts in 
the field of research, education and training and on our capacity to promote 
innovation. This is why we must fashion a veritable 'Europe of knowledge'."169 
In the field of education, three educational areas must be developed: Knowledge, 
citizenship and competence. It is important to cite here how the Commission defines the 
citizenship and competence areas, because these definitions will be used almost 
verbatim in the next Bologna documents. Thus, education for citizenship will focus on 
promoting the EU values:  
"The sharing of common values, and the development of a sense of belonging to a 
common social and cultural area. It must encourage a broader-based 
understanding of citizenship, founded on active solidarity and on mutual 
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understanding of the cultural diversities that constitute Europe's originality and 
richness."170 
Competence-based education is linked with employability, and its necessity is explained 
by the changing nature of the jobs which will require flexibility and life-long learning: 
"Developing employability through the acquisition of competencies made 
necessary through changes in work and its organisation. This means that it is 
necessary to promote on a lifelong basis creativity, flexibility, adaptability, the 
ability to 'learn to learn' and to solve problems. These are the conditions we must 
meet in order to overcome the now-rapid obsolescence of skills. Activities must 
be developed which help towards anticipating needs and towards the evolution of 
job profiles."171 
Finally, the Commission encourages six types of action, among which we quote 
mobility, virtual mobility (online learning), and the creation of cooperation networks 
among universities. The legal basis of this policy-area was to be found in the Articles 
126 and 127 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) which were 
concerned with the recognition of professional diplomas.  
 
Responding to the Commission’s request to create cooperation networks in the field of 
education, four EU members (France, the UK, Germany and Italy) signed the Sorbonne 
Declaration which must be read as an implementation of the Commission’s requests 
through the European Area of Higher Education. The EHEA was created to be "in the 
benefit "of Europe, of its students, and more generally of its citizens."172 While the 
declaration speaks of Europe, the continent, it is clearly referring to EU citizens through 
its reference to the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ policy area; furthermore, legally speaking, 
there is no such thing as a ‘European citizen’ unless it is taken as a short-hand for ‘EU 
citizens’.  
 
The Sorbonne Declaration mentions the duty of the university towards society, and this 
duty is not knowledge spreading, but helping students "to seek and find their own area 
of excellence."173 This area of excellence could mean anything, including research. But 
the ending directs the reader into a narrower understanding of ‘excellence’, namely 
employability: "We hereby commit ourselves to encouraging a common frame of 
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reference, aimed at improving external recognition and facilitating student mobility as 
well as employability"174 
 
In contrast with the Magna Charta, which conceived of universities as united by their 
disinterested pursuit of knowledge and education, in the Sorbonne Declaration 
universities are united by their Europeanity and the need to serve the citizens of the EU. 
The document ends with a ‘call to arms’ for other states to join: 
 "We call on other Member States of the Union and other European countries to 
join us in this objective and on all European Universities to consolidate Europe's 
standing in the world through continuously improved and updated education for 
its citizens."175 
 
The Bologna Declaration of 1999 
 
After the Sorbonne Declaration, several ministers of education from other countries 
were offended that they had not been included in the harmonisation process for mobility 
and employability, therefore a year later the Bologna Declaration was drafted to include 
more members. There is a radical shift in discourse visible between the Bologna Magna 
Charta of 1988 and the Bologna Declaration of 1999. One of the reasons is the identity 
of the drafters: The Bologna Declaration was a political document signed by ministers 
of education, while the Magna Charta was a statement issued by universities and signed 
by vice-chancellors. In spite of the difference in vision, the Bologna Declaration 
mentions the Magna Charta and uses it as a legitimation device because, in a document 
about the mission of the universities, the absence of the university’s voice would have 
been considered inappropriate. The reference to the Magna Charta fills this void and is 
taken to be the ersatz representative of the universities: 
"European higher education institutions, for their part, have accepted the challenge 
and taken up a main role in constructing the European area of higher education, 
also in the wake of the fundamental principles laid down in the Bologna Magna 
Charta Universitatum of 1988. This is of the highest importance, given that 
Universities' independence and autonomy ensure that higher education and 
research systems continuously adapt to changing needs, society's demands and 
advances in scientific knowledge."176  
The idea of a common European higher education area is taken from the Sorbonne 
Declaration while the principles of political autonomy and independence from the 
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Magna Charta are now seen as instrumental for the changing needs of society. While in 
the Magna Charta society’s needs were not specified, these remain unspecified in the 
Bologna Declaration but they are to be read as the needs already mentioned in the 
Sorbonne Declaration and the Commission Communication, i.e the needs of a ‘Europe 
of Knowledge’ to have educated, employable, competent citizens. The Bologna 
Declaration mentions the policy area ‘Europe of Knowledge’ and also introduces the 
idea of competitivity for the first time, as borrowed from the Commission’s document.  
 
The ministers motivate the "objective of increasing the international competitiveness of 
the European system of higher education"177 by appealing to the idea of civilisation’s 
vitality: "The vitality and efficiency of any civilisation can be measured by the appeal 
that its culture has for other countries."178 The idea that a civilisation has vitality or life, 
much like a biological organism, and that it can decay or even die, has been proposed by 
historian Oswald Spengler179 in his book Decline of the West: Perspectives of World 
History (1919). The idea of a living civilisation implies the possibility of death as a 
veiled threat that must be overcome. This foreshadows the discourse based on threats 
and risks that will be omnipresent later in the Bologna documents. The idea that a 
civilisation spreads through its culture might be loosely based on another historian’s 
major work, Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (1997)180 where he proposed the theory that conflicts between civilisations 
happen at cultural level. One conclusion would be that, if a civilisation wants to 
encroach on other parts of the world, it must first promote its culture. The idea of 
"efficiency" of a civilisation is however new, also the goal of measuring this efficiency. 
It foreshadows the focus on measurements and quality frameworks that will become the 
hallmark of the Bologna Process. Competitivity is here introduced as a desirable 
objective, but in the later documents it will be construed as a threat.  
 
At this initial point of the process, the main goal of the EHEA is presented as the 
promoting of student and teacher mobility. The document outlines the ways in which 
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the widespread mobility will be achieved through the EHEA construction: 
-"Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees" (this was already 
established in the Lisbon convention); 
- "Adoption of a system essentially based on two main cycles, undergraduate and 
graduate" (it was already in place everywhere, but the way they will do it later will be 
new, by shortening the duration of undergraduate studies, the famous 3-2-3 system); 
- "Establishment of a system of credits - such as in the ECTS system - as a proper 
means of promoting the most widespread student mobility" (the ECTS was already in 
place, promoted by the Lisbon convention); 
-"Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of free 
movement" (this is a new objective); 
-"Promotion of European co-operation in quality assurance with a view to developing 
comparable criteria and methodologies" (this is new and will play an important part 
later); 
- "Promotion of the necessary European dimensions in higher education" (this is new 
but the ‘European dimension’ is undefined). This particular point is a clash with the 
Magna Charta which was universalistic and conceived the duty of university as towards 
the humanity as a whole.  
 
If we separate only the new additions of the Bologna Declaration to the EU discourse 
on higher education, and if we exclude the advancements already brought by the 
previous mobility agreements and the Lisbon convention, we are left only with the 
European dimension and the quality assurance. These aspects will gain more weight 
with every following communiqué and will become independent goals, but in the 1999 
moment they were subordinated to the mobility goal. 
 
Prague Communiqué (2001) 
 
In 1999 the ministers had decided to create the EHEA on their own, as national 
representatives, assuming to be spoke-persons for the universities also. Soon afterwards, 
the student representatives held two meetings at European level where they asked to be 
involved in the BP and acknowledged as stakeholders. Therefore the Prague 
Communiqué introduced three new stakeholders: The students (represented by their 
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unions EUA and ESIB), the EU Commission and the higher education institutions.  
"Ministers also took note of the constructive assistance of the European 
Commission. […] They supported the idea that higher education should be 
considered a public good and is and will remain a public responsibility 
(regulations etc.), and that students are full members of the higher education 
community."181 
The Prague Communiqué adds three new lines of action to the previous six: Lifelong 
learning, involvement of the universities and students as partners, and promotion the 
attractiveness of the EHEA on an international level.  
 
The subjects of education are the citizens - who need recognition of degrees in order to 
be mobile and employed across borders, therefore the universities need to implement all 
the ECTS system. The ECTS and mutually recognised diplomas will "facilitate students' 
access to the European labour market and enhance the compatibility, attractiveness and 
competitiveness of European higher education."182 
 
The Berlin Communiqué (2003) 
 
In 2003, three intermediate priorities were defined for the nine initial action lines: 
Quality assurance, the two-cycle degree system, and the recognition of degrees and 
periods of study; also a tenth action line concerning doctoral studies was added.183  
Competitivity was linked with the social mission, as to make it clearer that the 
competition is not among the citizens themselves, but that all are competing together as 
a continent. 
"The need to increase competitiveness must be balanced with the objective of 
improving the social characteristics of the European Higher Education Area, 
aiming at strengthening social cohesion and reducing social and gender 
inequalities both at national and at European level."184 
For the first time the ministers stated that education has multiple purposes, not just 
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employability for the labour market, as there are also individual and academic needs: 
"First and second cycle degrees should have different orientations and various profiles 
in order to accommodate a diversity of individual, academic and labour market 
needs."185 However, in the future documents education will be consistently linked only 
with employability and lifelong learning.  
 
 
The Bergen Communiqué (2005) 
 
At the beginning of every communiqué the ministers re-iterate the commitment of the 
universities as if to remind that they have the support of the university, in almost a 
ritualistic fashion. The Bergen Communiqué makes no exception: "We welcome the 
clear commitment of higher education institutions across Europe to the Process"186 A 
consensus is constructed through this phrase which does not reflect the diversity of 
opinions on Bologna, as the critical voices coming from the university did not lack. 
Ruth Keeling thinks the discursive shift in higher education policies grants more 
autonomy to universities from the state, and this might be one of the reasons why 
universities have adopted the new language. "By adopting and contributing to this 
hybridised research-Bologna policy discourse, universities are able to redefine their 
missions positively, representing themselves as the ‘powerhouses’ of the new 
Europe"187 
 
The list of stakeholders increases now with the social partners - unspecified, but needed 
to accomplish the social inclusion goal:  
"Furthermore, there is a need for greater dialogue, involving Governments, 
institutions and social partners, to increase the employability of graduates with 
bachelor qualifications, including in appropriate posts within the public 
service."188 
The Commission, as one of the stakeholders, seems to gain more and more importance. 
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In the last two communiqués the EU Commission was acknowledged - as an interested 
party - but now it is needed and its consultative services are requested: "We ask the 
European Commission fully to consult all parties to the Bologna Process as work 
progresses."189 
 
Doctoral studies, usually considered as leading to a strictly academic path, are now 
aligned with the goal of employability. Doctoral students need to be employable as well, 
perhaps as to fulfil their role in the innovation economy: "We urge universities to ensure 
that their doctoral programmes promote interdisciplinary training and the development 
of transferable skills, thus meeting the needs of the wider employment market."190 
 
European education needs to be attractive for international students, as to make it more 
competitive: 
"The European Higher Education Area must be open and should be attractive to 
other parts of the world. Our contribution to achieving education for all should be 
based on the principle of sustainable development and be in accordance with the 
ongoing international work on developing guidelines for quality provision of 
cross-border higher education."191 
 
The idea that Europe’s economy and competitiveness hangs on its education, taken from 
the ‘Towards a Europe of Knowledge’ communication is re-iterated here: "As higher 
education is situated at the crossroads of research, education and innovation, it is also 
the key to Europe’s competitiveness."192 The cultural heritage is linked with the 
knowledge society in an unexplained way: "We must cherish our rich heritage and 
cultural diversity in contributing to a knowledge-based society."193 
 
The London Communiqué (2007) 
 
In the 2007 communiqué one can find a list of all the purposes that higher education 
institutions should aim for, according to the Bologna vision. These purposes start with 
citizenship, and include employment, innovation and increasing the knowledge base. 
The latter should be read as synonymous with increasing the human capital:  
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"Our aim is to ensure that our HEIs [higher education institutions] have the 
necessary resources to continue to fulfil their full range of purposes. Those 
purposes include: preparing students for life as active citizens in a democratic 
society; preparing students for their future careers and enabling their personal 
development; creating and maintaining a broad, advanced knowledge base; and 
stimulating research and innovation."194 
 
Student- centred education appears for the first time in the London Communiqué: "A 
significant outcome of the process will be a move towards student-centred higher 
education and away from teacher driven provision."195 All the communiqués re-iterate 
the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ goals, namely competitivity and attractivity of Europe 
linked to employability and mobility, which implies that ‘Europe of Knowledge’ is the 
main goal of the EHEA. 
 
The employers are added to the previous list of stakeholders: "Governments and HEIs 
will need to communicate more with employers and other stakeholders on the rationale 
for their reforms."196 Higher education is now cast in the role of smoothing out social 
problems and solving inequalities.  
"Higher education should play a strong role in fostering social cohesion, reducing 
inequalities and raising the level of knowledge, skills and competences in society. 
Policy should therefore aim to maximise the potential of individuals in terms of 
their personal development and their contribution to a sustainable and democratic 
knowledge-based society."197 
Andreas Fejes has argued that the idea behind this is that, if people are enabled to 
become more employable through education, the authorities do not need to pursue other 
reforms, for example by regulating the labour market. In the end, if the employable 
graduate did not find a job, it must be her fault, the State did everything it could by 
providing education. This marks a "shift from a social state to an enabling state, where 
the state should make it possible for the citizen to make active choices."198 
 
The Leuven Communiqué (2009) 
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A recurring and interesting aspect is that the future challenges of society are mentioned 
in every communiqué as a justification for the BP, but these challenges are not 
described; until the Leuven Communiqué, where the future challenges are finally 
spelt-out: The ageing population, the digital revolution, globalisation and the economic 
crisis. 
"Faced with the challenge of an ageing population Europe can only succeed in this 
endeavour if it maximises the talents and capacities of all its citizens and fully 
engages in lifelong learning as well as in widening participation in higher 
education […] the major challenge and the ensuing opportunities of globalisation 
and accelerated technological developments with new providers, new learners and 
new types of learning."199 
Higher education is presented as the solution to get out of the economic crisis:  
"Our societies currently face the consequences of a global financial and economic 
crisis. In order to bring about sustainable economic recovery and development, a 
dynamic and flexible European higher education will strive for innovation on the 
basis of the integration between education and research at all levels."200 
 
In 2009 the purposes of education, besides employability, now include social cohesion 
and a cultural development: "Various missions of higher education, ranging from 
teaching and research to community service and engagement in social cohesion and 
cultural development."201 The social cohesion mission is linked to the citizenship aim of 
education: "Student-centred learning and mobility will help students develop the 
competences they need in a changing labour market and will empower them to become 
active and responsible citizens."202 Mobility is also brought on board to contribute to 
the creation of the respectful and multicultural European citizen:  
"Mobility is important for personal development and employability, it fosters 
respect for diversity and a capacity to deal with other cultures. It encourages 
linguistic pluralism, thus underpinning the multilingual tradition of the European 
Higher Education Area and it increases cooperation and competition between 
higher education institutions."203 
 
The Budapest-Vienna Declaration (2010) 
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In 2010 the quality assurance agencies are added to the list of stakeholders which keeps 
growing: 
"In a unique partnership between public authorities, higher education institutions, 
students and staff, together with employers, quality assurance agencies, 
international organisations and European institutions, we have engaged in a series 
of reforms to build a European Higher Education Area based on trust, cooperation 
and respect for the diversity of cultures, languages, and higher education 
systems."204 
 
For the first time some critical voices are mentioned, but the ministers attribute the 
critique to a lack in communication, because it seems people have not received the right 
explanations:  
"Recent protests in some countries, partly directed against developments and 
measures not related to the Bologna Process, have reminded us that some of the 
Bologna aims and reforms have not been properly implemented and explained. We 
acknowledge and will listen to the critical voices raised among staff and 
students."205 
 
The Bucharest Communiqué (2012) 
 
This communiqué is the lengthiest and the most troubled by the financial crisis. 
Education is presented again as the solution to an economic crisis: 
"Europe is undergoing an economic and financial crisis with damaging societal 
effects. Within the field of higher education, the crisis is affecting the availability 
of adequate funding and making graduates’ job prospects more uncertain. Higher 
education is an important part of the solution to our current difficulties. Strong 
and accountable higher education systems provide the foundations for thriving 
knowledge societies. Higher education should be at the heart of our efforts to 
overcome the crisis – now more than ever."206 
This communiqué presents the concept of Competence Based Education and Training 
(CBET) as the assumed orthodoxy among educational practises, while singling out the 
entrepreneurial potential of these skills: 
"Today’s graduates need to combine transversal, multidisciplinary and innovation 
skills and competences with up-to-date subject-specific knowledge so as to be able 
to contribute to the wider needs of society and the labour market. We aim to 
enhance the employability and personal and professional development of 
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graduates throughout their careers. We will achieve this by improving cooperation 
between employers, students and higher education institutions, especially in the 
development of study programmes that help increase the innovation, 
entrepreneurial and research potential of graduates."207 
This is the only communiqué which might remind the reader of one of the guiding 
features of the idea of Bildung, i.e. the critical thinking, yet this is cast as just another 
skill for employability, a component of the entrepreneurial personality construction: 
"Higher education should be an open process in which students develop 
intellectual independence and personal self-assuredness alongside disciplinary 
knowledge and skills. Through the pursuit of academic learning and research, 
students should acquire the ability confidently to assess situations and ground 
their actions in critical thought."208 
 
2.3 The Subject of Education after Bologna: The Employable European Citizen 
 
In this section we want to describe who is the subject of education according to the 
Bologna communiqués and what it entails for higher education policies. We shall argue 
that the educational subject of BP is the European citizen defined in a narrow 
understanding as the mobile and employable European.  
 
The year 2014 marked the anniversary of 15 years since the Bologna Process was put in 
motion, a process which some authors characterise as "possibly the deepest and most far 
reaching higher education reform process since World War II."209 On this occasion, the 
former German minister of education, Edelgard Bulmahn, one of the signatories of the 
Bologna Declaration in 1999, declared in a press statement what had been the Bologna 
vision: 
"We had a vision: Europe should not only be an economic space, not only a labour 
market, not only a political entity, but rather a cultural, social and a strong 
scientific unit. And so the Bologna Process was born."210 
This declaration might remind some of Jean Monnet’s words about the EU: "If I had to 
do it again, I would begin with culture." In 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht included for 
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the first time culture as one of the unifying forces in European integration. 
"The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member 
States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time 
bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore."211 
In the same Treaty educational mobility is explicitly promoted with terms that will later 
be borrowed by the Bologna treaties: 
"Community action shall be aimed at:  
- developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the 
teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States; 
- encouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the 
academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study; 
- promoting co-operation between educational establishments;"212 
It is hard to explain the Bologna impetus for mobility through educational 
standardisation as a sudden process, without reading it against the general EU incentive 
to further European unification through culture and education. These processes need to 
be taken together as two faces of the same coin.  
 
There is at least one reference to European citizenship in each of the Bologna Process 
communiqués. Already in 1998, in the Sorbonne Declaration, the beneficiaries of the 
educational mobility were the citizens of Europe: 
"We call on other Member States of the Union and other European countries to 
join us in this objective and on all European Universities to consolidate Europe's 
standing in the world through continuously improved and updated education for 
its citizens."213  
All through the Bologna Declaration of 1999 the European Higher Education Area is 
justified because it will make European citizens more mobile and, as a consequence, 
more employable: "The creation of the European area of higher education as a key way 
to promote citizens' mobility and employability and the Continent's overall 
development."214 The intended subject of education is not the generic individual, as it 
was the case in the Bildung paradigm, nor the citizen of the European state - because the 
rights and duties of the citizenship differ across the states - but a generic European 
citizen which is in need of a definition.  
 
European citizenship is not defined explicitly in any of the communiqués, but it can be 
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reconstructed from the attributes that always follow it closely in all the declarations. 
Thus, the European citizen is mobile, active, employable, knows at least two European 
languages, and has a European identity (i.e. belongs to the common cultural space of 
Europe and shares certain cultural values). Through a discourse analysis Andreas Fejes 
has reconstructed the European citizens from the BP declarations as:  
"One who is mobile, ﬂexible and shows respect for diversity. […]Such an idea 
constructs a ‘cultural subject’ with speciﬁc European values. It is intertwined with 
an idea that there are cultural differences within Europe that should be 
respected."215  
Throughout the communiqués, European citizenship consistently appears in the same 
phrases as employability and student mobility, as if these two were linked from the 
policymakers’ perspective.  
"As first laid down in the Bologna declaration, the rationale behind the Bologna 
process has been to promote European citizens’ lasting employability and the 
international competitiveness of the European higher education system."216  
 
If we take the Bologna communiqués at face value, mobility was the main reason to 
create the EHEA. Mobility of students can be linked with two other features: 
Constructing the cultural European identity and worker’s mobility. The goal of the 
Erasmus programme - a programme focused solely on student mobility - was to further 
the European integration through the creation of European citizens. When the EU was 
created with the purpose "to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the 
peoples of Europe,"217 it can be understood that a close union is not possible without a 
promotion of the common European values and this can be done efficiently through 
mobility of the students. The Bologna Declaration implies that there are some shared 
European values of the citizens and constructs the Europe of Knowledge as a vehicle to 
share these values even more: 
"A Europe of Knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor for 
social and human growth and as an indispensable component to consolidate and 
enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the necessary 
competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an 
awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural 
space."218 
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In the Berlin Communiqué the ministers had stressed the need to study abroad as a 
pre-condition for a ‘full’ European identity: 
"the necessity of ensuring a substantial period of study abroad in joint degree 
programmes as well as proper provision for linguistic diversity and language 
learning, so that students may achieve their full potential for European identity, 
citizenship and employability."219 
European citizenship was construed as a potential that needed education to be fully 
reached. If employability is a key feature of the European citizen, we can conclude that 
the intended outcome of education, after the BP, is the active European citizen, i.e. 
someone who can support himself/herself. This definition of the European citizen as 
employee or self-employed entails the exclusion of certain categories of people who 
cannot work: Foreigners, children, pensioners, the disabled. Effectively only the 
able-bodied employable citizens or the entrepreneurial self-employed count for the 
future Europe of Knowledge.  
 
Jonna Johansson thinks that student mobility foreshadows workers’ mobility which is 
needed to construct the common market. Mobile students have acquired certain features 
that will prepare them for being good mobile workers: They speak foreign languages 
and are used to living away from their families for a long time.220  
"The Ministers "stress the necessity of ensuring a substantial period of study 
abroad in joint degree programmes as well as proper provision for linguistic 
diversity and language learning, so that students may achieve their full potential 
for European identity, citizenship and employability."221 
 
Fejes argues that the concept of employability became mainstream only in the last 20 to 
30 years, simultaneously with the creation of EHEA, and replaced the discourses about 
workforce. If previously the state was responsible for the employment of its citizens, 
nowadays, after the shift towards employability, the citizen is responsible for finding 
his/her own work. If work is not to be found, this is because of the lack of 
employability, i.e. employable skills. "This kind of discourse positions the citizen as 
responsible for her/his own employment, and less emphasis is placed on structural 
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inequalities and problems in the labour market."222 Johansson also notices that the 
employability discourse replaced the initial focus on employment in the EU: "In the 
beginning of European cooperation, after the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
mobility was mainly linked to employment but later on we see how employment, 
education and mobility become linked."223 Fejes argues that the focus on employability 
is not merely a European issue, it is a global trend traceable in the global newspeak 
which he designates as the ‘planetspeak’. This omnipresent discourse makes 
employability seem something ‘natural’ and desirable.224 
 
Marie-Pierre Moreau thinks that the discursive shift towards employability means that 
now the blame for unemployment will rest solely on the shoulders of the citizens. If the 
EU or the state does whatever it can do to enable the citizen to get a good education, i.e. 
become employable, then its mission is over. The duty of the state will be then reduced 
to ensuring a good education, while being relieved of responsibility towards regulating 
the labour market. "This policy discourse constructs employability as matter of 
individual attributes and responsibility, with scarce reference to structured opportunities 
in the education and labour markets."225 
 
In the Bologna documents employability is defined as a set of skills and competences. 
The EHEA is supposed to provide "the learners with the opportunity to acquire 
knowledge, skills and competences furthering their careers and lives as democratic 
citizens as well as their personal development."226 The skills are frequently referred to 
as transferable while the competences are used to define the learning outcomes. The 
skills and competences are not merely desirable, but necessary in achieving an ‘active 
citizenship’ in Europe:  
"Learning for active citizenship includes access to the skills and competencies that 
young people will need for effective economic participation under conditions of 
technological modernisation, economic globalisation, and, very concretely, 
transnational European labour markets. At the same time, the social and 
communicative competencies that are both part of new demands and which flow 
from changing work and study contexts are themselves of critical importance for 
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living in culturally, ethnically and linguistically plural worlds. These 
competencies are not simply desirable for some, they are becoming essential for 
all."227 
 
One of the main targets of BP was to institute a common framework for quality 
assurance that would make possible the equivalence of degrees, which would allow 
some sort of comparison between the diverse systems of education in Europe. The 
common ground for quality evaluations was found in the learning outcomes and 
competences: 
“We adopt the overarching framework for qualifications in the EHEA, 
comprising three cycles (including, within national contexts, the possibility of 
intermediate qualifications), generic descriptors for each cycle based on learning 
outcomes and competences, and credit ranges in the first and second cycles."228 
Learning outcomes are what the student should know and be able to do at the end of an 
educational cycle, module or course. Learning outcomes are statements, "explicit 
assertions about the outcomes of learning - the results of learning."229 The 
standardisation of learning outcomes was in itself another project developed all around 
the globe. So far there have been several projects in this direction: The Dublin 
descriptors (European Project), the Tuning project (specifically linked with the BP), the 
DeSeCo Project (sponsored by OECD) etc. Taking as an example the Dublin descriptors 
- the most famous project - which defines the learning outcomes at the end of each of 
the three cycles, one can notice the prevalence of abilities to do something over 
theoretical knowledge. Knowledge itself is defined as capacities and competences to 
understand something, then communicate and apply this knowledge.230  
 
In what way was the BP a change in the paradigm of higher education? From a process 
focused on theoretical knowledge (episteme), and creating ‘cultivated men’ as an 
outcome (be they the elites, the citizens or the ‘man of reason’), higher education is now 
reconfigured to produce European citizens which have the abilities to do something, to 
apply knowledge, to solve problems, to communicate, to lead, to perform. This should 
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remind us of the Aristotelian meaning of craft (techne), which implied competence to do 
something while aided by knowledge.  
"Techne is a practical knowledge, which attaches itself to a competence in 
making, producing and manufacturing. […] Techne is more than a competence, as 
it both consists of an ability to carry out a procedure in practice in the form of a 
‘coping skill’ and to give an account of the general laws and principles behind the 
procedure."231 
Insofar as the learning outcomes cannot be reduced to problem-solving competences, 
but also require the knowledge of the topic, then the university knowledge defined by 
the Dublin descriptors fits mostly with the definition of techne. 
 
The Bologna graduates will go through an education based on producing competences 
and skills. At the end they should have some knowledge that they can apply to solve 
certain problems, and also some transferable skills that make them employable even if 
the labour market changes its demands. Some of these skills are required only to 
function in the European multicultural world such as language training or intercultural 
competences, while other skills are specifically for the labour market, such as digital or 
entrepreneurial skills. In the end the sum of all skills and competences should make the 
European citizen fit to work in any country in the EU: 
"Learning for active citizenship includes access to the skills and competencies that 
young people will need for effective economic participation under conditions of 
technological modernisation, economic globalisation, and, very concretely, 
transnational European labour markets. At the same time, the social and 
communicative competencies that are both part of new demands and which flow 
from changing work and study contexts are themselves of critical importance for 
living in culturally, ethnically and linguistically plural worlds. These 
competencies are not simply desirable for some, they are becoming essential for 
all."232 
 
There is a duality in the official EU discourse about skills. On one hand the universities 
need to deliver graduates that have the skills that the European labour market demands 
right now. On the other hand the EU officials admit that any skill is perishable or can 
become obsolete, so in the end everybody will need retraining through life-long 
learning. Nowadays the most desirable skills are the digital and entrepreneurial skills, 
but nobody knows how the labour market will change in the future. 
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"There was consensus on the need for comprehensive change to curricula and 
learning methods and for […] the inclusion of transversal and transferable skills 
and of fundamental notions of economics and of technology in curricula at all 
levels of qualification. Curricula should be "T-shaped": rooted in the specific 
academic discipline while at the same time interacting and cooperating with 
partners in other disciplines and sectors;"233 
The ideal European graduate is the competent citizen, possessing skills that will solve 
current problems, and the capacity to re-train as many times as necessary. This is not the 
‘cultivated man’, not the ‘specialist’ type of man as identified by Weber,234 but the 
flexible professional. Anne Seller argues that the ‘specialist type’ such as a doctor or an 
engineer implies adopting a certain worldview and a set of values. This cannot be 
reduced to skills or competences not learnt overnight:  
"But think of what is involved in learning to be a doctor, or lawyer, or accountant. 
Implicit is not simply a set of skills: how to remove an appendix, diagnose 
diabetes, but an entire way of understanding the world (consider the categories of 
diseased and healthy for example), an epistemology, a set of values - one learns to 
be a doctor, not to do doctoring, and I think any attempt to do less would not only 
be irresponsible (to both student and wider community) but dishonest. It is almost 
an Aristotelian point: in teaching skills, you develop the virtues implicit in 
practising those skills. And, one might add, you induct into a whole set of social 
relations, impart a metaphysics. Yet it is precisely an invitation to buy itemized 
skills, without such induction, which the market model of higher education 
offers."235 
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In privileging techne over episteme, the competence based model of education did not 
privilege the specialist over the cultivated man, but both were discarded for the flexible 
professional. The flexible professional is the sum of his or her skills, but these skills are 
not fixed, and can be gained or lost all through her life, making the person continually 
(self-)employable. The labour market keeps changing and, as a consequence, students 
need to continuously learn and develop new competences: 
"Lifelong learning is one of the important factors in meeting the needs of a 
changing labour market, and higher education institutions play a central role in 
transferring knowledge and strengthening regional development, including by the 
continuous development of competences and reinforcement of knowledge 
alliances."236 
The changing labour market is the threat that must be overcome, while the employee or 
self-employed status is presented as the reward. The useful education defined as 
education for employability has many justifications in the BP documents, but the main 
container for all these reasons is the threat of the insecure and unpredictable future. We 
can only be sure about one thing regarding the future: That it will be insecure for 
workers. This type of discourse is based on risks and threats and some authors think that 
this risk is manufactured. 
"The narratives of threat contain an idea of risk. If certain measures are not taken, 
there is a risk that something bad will happen. These narratives are projections of 
the present on the future—someone writes about a future that does not exist as 
natural and real. It is written as a fact and some measures will have to be taken to 
avoid this risk. The future is constructed as a technique for governing and the 
result is that what is in the unknown future is seen as a fact and a truth."237 
 
It is possible to link the goal of employability to a perceived threat of the technological 
revolution. As the digital and technological revolution is unfolding, many jobs become 
obsolete and people need to retrain their skills if they want to get another job. But how 
can anyone know what jobs will be required in 10 or even 5 years from now on? How 
can anyone predict what skills will be needed and, on the basis of this prediction, 
discourage the teaching of any other ‘useless’ skills? 
 
Luciano Floridi argues that, if we assume that technological revolution is coming and 
that probably most of the jobs will be outsourced to robots, we need to re-think our 
attitude towards unemployment. More specifically, we need to change how we feel 
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about technological unemployment, first defined by Keynes as the "unemployment due 
to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at 
which we can find new uses for labour."238 This is not such a bleak future, on the 
contrary, it might imply solving of many of our economic problems, because:  
"[t]echnological unemployment is what we have been planning all along, by 
relying on animals, other humans, science, technology, capital and compound 
interest. We have been trying to make ourselves redundant since time 
unmemorable so that we may be leisurely occupied."239 
If technological unemployment can be coupled with solving the resource problem, then 
people will need to work only a few hours a week in the future: 
"In the long run, next century or next millennium, technological unemployment 
will turn into leisure occupation only if we will succeed in decoupling 
unemployment from the lack of income, the consequent social unrest and the 
related erosion of personal dignity, insofar as having a paid job is still seen in our 
present culture as synonymous with having a role in society. Call this the 
‘resource problem’."240 
 
Whether we want it or not, the life of the future will be a life of leisure and 
contemplation for many people, not just for the elites, as in Aristotle’s times. If we 
assume this to be the case (again, if the resource problem will be fixed by then, for 
instance by introducing a minimal income for every citizen or similar redistributive 
devices), what future perspective does the BP offer for us? If the BP continues on this 
track, the obsession with employment will not cease and people will be discouraged to 
find a meaning for their lives outside work. The life of leisure and contemplation will be 
impossible for the people educated towards employability because they will not have 
the general knowledge of the cultivated man, the interest in theoretical problems, the 
imagination and the empathy cultivated through humanities. At this point we can 
conclude that the BP is making a bet on how the future of employment will look and is 
placing all the stakes on this bet. One such stake is the future of European higher 
education. The Bologna vision of the future is not informed by any predictions; it is just 
a form of wishful thinking that someday we will counteract technological 
unemployment through the massification of higher education. On this type of wishful 
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thinking hangs the fate of the humanities in many universities.  
 
In this chapter we argued that the policy makers involved in the BP have a different idea 
about who is the subject of education then both the traditional Enlightenment-inspired 
Humboldtian (universal ‘man’, able to live anywhere) and the postmodernist (the 
embedded social ‘subject’ that can never be ‘universal’ but whose identity is dictated by 
contextual, social circumstances, and who is always ‘object to power’ no matter in what 
regime he or she lives). Even though sometimes the BP pays lip-service to Humboldtian 
ideals, it generally promotes a very different idea of ‘who is being educated’. The 
institutional setting of the BP shows this, through its involvement of so many parties in 
the club of ‘stakeholders’: Business, civil society, lobbyists, local, national and 
supranational politicians, owners of educational establishments, public officials etc. - 
these are all ‘stakeholders’. They would not be stakeholders if the purpose of education 
were ‘free knowledge’ or to educate the ‘man’ in general.  
 
The Bologna Process radically parted ways with the traditional Humboldtian vision of 
the university as a place of independent research and teaching, and proposed a new role 
of the university as a socially engaged and responsible institution that delivers 
employable graduates. This parting of ways is reflected in the Bologna ministerial 
communiqués as the textual analysis has shown. If education is to be only instrumental 
for the purpose of furthering employability, then this should pose a special problem for 
theoretical disciplines, including humanities, that never articulated themselves as 
directly useful for society. Any study directed towards episteme is in principle not 
leading to immediate employment, therefore humanities are ‘useless’ in principle. The 
irony of humanities’ fate is striking. Once humanities were deemed the most appropriate 
education for citizenship, now the humanities are the least useful education for 
European citizenship. This change was triggered by the transforming definition of 
citizenship. The reasons why European citizenship should be defined thus, as 
employability and mobility, are never explained in the policy papers. We are left with 
the discourse of threats and risks as a provisional justification, and the gloomy 
predictions about the future. But if the humanities want to reclaim their historical role as 
education for citizenship, a turn towards knowledge as phronêsis might be the only 
unexplored option. We shall see describe this in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3. Useful for Everyone? Post-Bologna Strategies for 
Defending the Humanities 
 
The BP was not the only higher education policy to promote a discourse based on 
‘usefulness’ of education. All over the world higher education is asked to account for 
the public funds it spends by giving some explanation in terms of public usefulness. 
Most of the time this usefulness is construed as market value, employability, skills for 
life, increasing the competitivity of a society through its human capital. Can humanities 
prove that they are needed even in times of usefulness-oriented thinking? In this chapter 
we will look at the new arguments in favour of maintaining an important role of 
humanities with the university that have been put forward by several thinkers in the 
wake of the Bologna Process. There are at least two different types of strategies for 
responding to the new challenge faced by the humanities. One of them focuses on 
knowledge understood primarily as episteme, while the other focuses on knowledge 
understood primarily as phronêsis. 
 
The first strategy consists in not accepting the challenge or refusing the claim it is based 
on as such. One possible way to construe a defence for the role of humanities in a public 
debate dominated by the proclaimed value of ‘usefulness’ is to claim the following: 
A) Humanities do not need to be useful: Requiring them to be useful misses the 
essence of what humanities really stand for; 
 
Another possible strategy consists in accepting the challenge and thus assuming that 
indeed any topic in order to gain entry-rights into universities as public funded 
institutions need to be ‘useful’ yet casting this usefulness in a different way than the 
way it is prevailingly used. In other words, this strategy consists in admitting that 
‘usefulness’ is a guiding value for discriminating between what should be taught at 
university and what should not, but at the same time redefining the ‘usefulness’ of 
humanities. This strategy is at the core of the following claim: 
B) Humanities are necessary for individuals to become citizens in a contemporary 
democracy. 
We shall explore both strategies in the following two sections. 
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3.1. In the Name of Science 
 
In this section we shall review the argument that humanities have intrinsic value and 
should be pursued ‘for their own sake’. This type of defence removes the immediate 
need for external justifications so it should render humanities invulnerable to demands 
for usefulness from the politicians of the day, while it acknowledges that in the long 
term humanities can be useful. However, this type of defence strategy, aimed at keeping 
the humanities’ place within the university, does have problems of its own. Let us 
examine several of them. 
 
The argument for the intrinsic value of humanities brings forth the following claim: 
Humanities are a legitimate form of knowledge, just as the natural sciences. If any 
science is valuable as an end in itself, then humanities should be considered valuable in 
themselves. In other words, humanities are not useless at all. In the end humanities may 
lead to innovation and discoveries, but this can be achieved only after we have accepted 
humanities as a distinct area of knowledge which is valuable in itself as a quest for 
knowledge. Innovation is not achieved after pressures from authorities to respond to the 
urgent needs of the day. This type of defence has two meanings, one negative and one 
positive, as identified by Helen Small: Negatively it signifies a "resistance to 
requirements for demonstrated practical or instrumental value," and positively "a way of 
speaking about value that refers us back to the object itself and offers to free us from the 
charge of mere subjectivism."241 
 
One well-known formulation of this type of defence was put forth by John Henry 
Newman in his book The Idea of a University: 
"I am asked what is the end of University Education, and of the Liberal or 
Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive it to impart: I answer, that what I have 
already said has been sufficient to show that it has a very tangible, real, and 
sufficient end, though the end cannot be divided from that knowledge itself. 
Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human 
mind, that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward. And if 
this is true of all knowledge, it is true also of that special Philosophy."242 
This idea has a long pedigree: The mathematician David Hilbert had claimed that the 
most useful achievements of science were owed not to the ‘practically-minded folks’, 
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but to those who pursued science for its own sake, the ‘disinterested fools’: 
"With astonishing sharpness, the great mathematician Poincaré once attacked 
Tolstoy, who had suggested that pursuing “science for science’s sake” is foolish. 
The achievements of industry, for example, would never have seen the light of 
day had the practical-minded existed alone and had not these advances been 
pursued by disinterested fools. The glory of the human spirit, so said the famous 
Königsberg mathematician Jacobi, is the single purpose of all science."243  
The slogan of knowledge for knowledge’s sake was coined by Hilbert in the same 
lecture: "We must know, we will know". This slogan encompasses the general 
significance of the intrinsic value argument, that we have a duty to pursue knowledge 
until there is nothing left to discover anymore.  
 
This type of justification places humanities on the same level as all other sciences and 
should work in the same way for any university discipline:  
"It is tremendously important to recognize and resist the pressure placed upon 
scientists, scholars, and teachers to justify their labor solely in terms of immediate 
instrumentality, either as technological payoff or as bureaucratic efficiency in 
credentializing masses of university students. In fact, I would argue that this is 
indeed a common ground of the sciences and the humanities in their institutional 
relations because it is no more obvious that studying the migratory patterns of 
monarch butterﬂies has some technological payoff than studying the development 
of the sonnet in sixteenth-century England. Knowledge should be defended for its 
own sake, not solely for its instrumental beneﬁts, because it is the object of a 
human desire, the desire to know, a desire that ought not to be frustrated any more 
than any other human desire."244 
 
In order for this argument to work, we need to accept first the epistemic legitimacy of 
humanistic knowledge. There are numerous arguments in favour of this position, 
perhaps the most famous were developed by Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert. 
Dilthey had argued that the ‘the human sciences’ (Geisteswissenschaften), comprised of 
humanities and social sciences, had a specific method (the abstract methodology, as 
opposed to the analytic one found in natural sciences) and an object of study (cultural 
systems and human interactions) that made them independent disciplines from the 
natural sciences.245 For Rickert, the Geisteswissenschaften were the ‘sciences of 
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culture’ and were distinguished by dealing with value-related objects, while the natural 
sciences dealt with value-free objects.246 
 
If we were to accept humanities as a distinct and legitimate epistemic field, several 
questions arise. While it is clear for most that mathematics and physics will lead to 
some sort of usefulness for society in the long term, it is not clear how humanities will 
do so. Especially since, if we identify humanistic knowledge with episteme, as this 
argument aims to, all previous practical justifications of humanities through character 
training and socially usefulness are lost. The key argument here seems to be pointing at 
innovation. While scientific knowledge does not immediately render itself to marketable 
outcomes, ‘innovation’ is the current name given to the process that aims to turn 
episteme into something profitable, effectively creating market value. While the term 
‘innovation’ has been previously used in economic contexts, for example by Adam 
Smith, the author who popularised this use was Bo-Åke Lundwall in a booklet from 
1985 about product innovation. There he defined innovation as "the result of collisions 
between technical opportunity and user needs."247 
 
Sharon Rider has argued that scientific research is useful in the end for society but only 
if it is not forced to follow certain narrow and immediate conceptions of usefulness, 
related to the demands of the day. She argues that we cannot tell scientists what to 
discover and then expect specific results, because scientific discovery does not function 
like project management. Most of the technological and useful discoveries of our times 
were made possible because someone at some point in history pursued a certain idea 
just for the sake of knowledge. Rider illustrates this idea by mentioning the discovery of 
formalisation by Frege, Russell, and Hilbert, which led to the invention of algorithms 
and then informatics.248 The order is this, argues Rider: First the theoretical 
breakthrough is achieved through basic research, and then we can find useful 
applications for it. The electricity was not discovered because it was useful, rather 
useful applications were found afterwards. "Strategy models benefit neither innovative 
scientific thinking nor social needs. Basic research, on the other hand, unencumbered by 
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managerialism, is a necessary prerequisite for all technical developments, applications 
and innovations."249  
 
Since so many useful applications can be traced back to philosophy (for example the 
Newtonian classical mechanics started as a form of natural philosophy), then we cannot 
dismiss any academic discipline that might appear useless. One reason for extending 
this logic to any academic discipline that might appear useless is to claim that we need 
to support them all because we cannot predict which one will lead to the next 
revolutionary innovation, even if this innovation might happen far away in the future. 
"Just as nobody can foretell when and in what context the next great scientific 
breakthrough will occur, nobody can say for certain what society will be like or will 
need in fifty or a hundred or two hundred years."250 This argument can be extended 
even to those academic disciplines which are designated with a German term as 
Orchideenwissenschaften (’orchid studies’), pointing at the narrowly specialised and 
apparently useless studies. Until several decades ago, the study of the Hanseatic League 
(a commercial confederation of cities from the 13th to 17th century) would have been an 
example of an ‘orchid study’. However, with the advent of the EU and its need for 
historical legitimation, the Hanseatic League is currently presented as a historical 
precedent of a commercial union taking place in Europe, hence for the EU. From an 
‘orchid study’, the topic rose in importance until nowadays is one of the well-funded 
topics from the humanities. The study of the Hanseatic League has not led to any 
innovation, but it is ‘useful’ nowadays in ways unforeseen 50 years ago. One cannot 
predict the future usefulness for society of any of our current ‘orchid studies’. 
 
This argument however does not help us understand why the humanities should be kept 
in the university. Historically, the place of humanities has been in the university, but 
should it be, in the light of the argument from intrinsic value? Because if humanities 
legitimise themselves as areas of research, why do we need to teach humanities in the 
university? Why not relocate humanities in small research centres independent from the 
academia? 
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A positive answer to this question assumes that the link between teaching and research 
is unbreakable, in the Humboldtian tradition. Steve Fuller has brought forth a 
contemporary argument for this link. His main thesis is that universities dwell in the 
‘creative destruction of social capital’. Social capital is defined as "the comparative 
advantage that a group or network enjoys by virtue of its collective capacity to act on a 
form of knowledge."251 Following the idea of Nico Stehr who argued that knowledge is 
not an endless resource, but rather a positional good that gives an advantage to its 
owners, this would mean that academics, as researchers, have access to more knowledge 
than the rest of the population and could use this resource to gain certain social 
advantages, including social capital. However, this is not the case in our society, argues 
Fuller, because the universities as institutions were designed to creatively destruct 
through teaching the social capital gained through research:  
"On the one hand, research emerges from networks of particular scientists, 
investors and other stakeholders who are tempted to restrict the flow of benefits to 
themselves. On the other hand, the university’s commitment to education compels 
that such knowledge be taught to people far removed from this social capital base, 
who may in turn take what they learn in directions that erase whatever advantage 
the original network enjoyed. All of this is to the good: it contributes to the overall 
enlightenment of society, while spurring on the formation of new networks of 
innovation."252 
The concept of creative destruction of social capital had been put forth by Habermas as 
a way to warn against creating a monopoly of knowledge that would be detrimental for 
deliberative democracy.253 Fuller’s argument concerns the knowledge produced in the 
universities in general, it does not specify the humanities. If we were to use it for our 
purpose, we would then need to assume that humanities are a highly specialised type of 
knowledge that would not be accessible to the general public, just as mathematics or 
physics are. Otherwise there would be no peril of accumulation of social capital from 
the humanities researchers detrimental to the general public. 
 
If humanities research produces valuable and specialised knowledge, then humanities 
need to be taught in the universities because new generations of researchers need to be 
created continuously. As Richard Rorty once said, "somebody's got to read these 
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difficult books, and it takes a lot of time."254 The specialised pursuit of knowledge 
demands a long training in order to develop the research abilities associated with each 
discipline. Rider argues along this line that the development of knowledge in the 
disciplines is a continuously evolving process that cannot be started or stopped at will:  
"The university has a mission to support and maintain different scientific 
traditions, to keep different ways of seeing, studying and understanding our 
common world alive.[...] The disciplines manifest a way of thinking that has taken 
generations of scholars and scientists to evolve."255 
It would follow that, from this perspective, the subject of humanities education should 
be the scholar or the professor.  
 
If we agree that humanities’ place is in the university, that research needs to be coupled 
with teaching, and that it is useful for the entire society to treat humanities as an end in 
itself, we are still left with the question concerning the practical issue of funding. I. 
How many ‘orchid studies’ should be funded? How many student places should be 
granted for each discipline? How many research centres? The argument for the intrinsic 
value of humanities does not give us an answer to these concerns because it is 
under-determined from the start. It is an argument for humanities as episteme, and thus 
ignores the techne component of humanistic knowledge (for example the rhetoric and 
communication skills embedded in communication studies) or the phronetic knowledge, 
what we presented in chapter 1 as the character building. Without acknowledging these 
two components of humanistic knowledge, the argument for the intrinsic value of 
humanities does not pose a strong opposition to the Bologna concern for ‘usefulness’. 
Another problem is that this type of argument cannot be extended to save those 
humanities that are immediately useful nowdays, namely the ones focused on the techne 
aspect of knowledge: journalism, translation studies, rethorics, etc. These types of 
studies are protected by the ‘usefulness’ mindset of Bologna policies, but cannot 
compete with the ‘long-term usefulness’ of potentially any humanities based on 
episteme because research is not their strong suit.  
 
The notion of ‘usefulness’, as used in the intrinsic value argument, projects in the future 
an uncertain usefulness for the entire society, which will benefit from the innovation 
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and discoveries of basic research, effectively asking society to place a bet on an 
unpredictable future. If society would be willing to place its bet on this uncertain future 
that might require innovation stemming from basic research, it could be done on 
minimal investment in teaching. Even if an increase of funding in research centres 
seems to be the best option for achieving future innovation, one cannot justify the 
massification of studies in the humanities based only on these grounds. If the outcomes 
of humanistic studies are only researchers and professors, as the intrinsic value 
argument would have it, then how many researchers are too many? How much funding 
should be allocated for something that is possibly useful, and how much to the studies 
that deliver right now employable graduates in the humanities? The argument of the 
intrinsic values of humanities is underdetermined in its current formulation and cannot 
be used for any practical decision making, rendering it useless for the BP policy makers. 
Let us see next whether there is another argument that would redefine ‘usefulness’ 
while making its positive effects visible in a shorter time-frame.  
 
3.2 Humanities as Citizenry Education for All 
 
In her 2006 book entitled Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Martha 
Nussbaum offers a contemporary argument for the usefulness of humanities. Her 
argument is important because it can be presented as an alternative to the ‘usefulness’ as 
employability perspective, and also to the ‘usefulness’ as innovation. 
 
Nussbaum’s main point is that we need to educate citizens for the contemporary 
democratic liberal constitutions and this education is best done through arts and 
humanities. A secondary point is that humanities are essential in education all through 
the ages of schooling, not just in the university. But the university is the place where 
critical thinking and Socratic education will develop the capacities for full democratic 
citizenship in the students. Pupils and high-schoolers need humanities and arts in order 
to develop a certain sensibility towards otherness, a general disposition towards 
empathy and tolerance (this idea is based on Rousseau’s educational principles found in 
Emile). But, as they become adults, students need the common core of liberal arts in 
order to develop their capacities for full citizenship in a democracy. While education 
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has a larger role in helping people lead meaningful lives, the core of the argument in 
this book focuses on the role of education in preparing citizens for democracy.256 
 
Nussbaum argues that the best type of education in a democracy (assumed to be the 
desirable constitution for anyone nowadays) is education for dissent. Producing "a 
culture of individual dissent"257 should make people’s lives better. One of the reasons is 
that group conformity and peer pressure will lead people to do horrible things that they 
would have otherwise objected to as individuals (the experiments of Stanley Milgram, 
Solomon Asch, and Philip Zimbardo are used as examples of how easily people can be 
persuaded to do things against their own judgement).258 
 
If democracies are to promote the rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”259 
as they claim, then they need to try to cultivate the following abilities in their citizens: 
Thinking independently of tradition, recognition in other human beings of their equals 
and treating them as ends, with empathy, being critical about politicians, imagining 
what it is like to be someone else, thinking about the general good of the nation and 
humankind.260 The list is open-ended and it has been refined by Nussbaum in several 
writings over the years. Its philosophical roots lay in the capability approach.  
 
The capability approach was developed by Martha Nussbaum together with Amartya 
Sen and it is based on the idea that the language of capabilities is much more 
appropriate for debating the political aims of a society than the language of utility, the 
language of resources distribution, or the human rights language. According to this 
approach, the main question politicians should ask is "What is A actually able to do and 
to be?"261 So the question is not what A wants to do, which might be biased because A 
does not see herself as a human being with full rights (as is the case of widows in India), 
or what satisfaction does A get from a certain policy (because rich people require very 
sophisticated levels of stimulation while poor people might be content with the bare 
minimum), but what could A do if she wanted to? People may never fully employ their 
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capability to do something, but this should be because they chose not to, and not 
because they were constrained. "A person with plenty of food can always choose to fast; 
a person who has access to subsidized university education can always decide to do 
something else instead. By making opportunities available, government enhances, and 
does not remove, choice."262 An advantage of this approach is the focus on the 
individual lives, in contrast to the utilitarian approach which looked at the sum of total 
happiness in a society, a quantitative approach that ignored that many might be 
miserable while few very happy. 
 
Contrary to Sen’s capability approach, which had left the list of capabilities up to future 
political debates, Martha Nussbaum thinks that making the list of basic human 
capabilities to be developed is the philosopher’s task, and that such a list would not be 
culturally biased: 
"The basic point of the account is the same: to put forward something that people 
from many different traditions, with many different fuller conceptions of the good, 
can agree on as the necessary basis for pursuing their good life."263  
In the article from 1997 the open-ended list of human capabilities universally needed 
was the following: Life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, 
emotions, practical reason, friendship, respect, living with other species, political 
control over ones' environment and material control.264 In Not for Profit the list is much 
more specific and needs to be quoted in full: 
"What lessons does this analysis suggest as we ask what schools can and should 
do to produce citizens in and for a healthy democracy? 
° Develop students’ capacity to see the world from the view-point of other people, 
particularly those whom their society tends to portray as lesser, as “mere objects” 
° Teach attitudes toward human weakness and helplessness that suggest that 
weakness is not shameful and the need for others not unmanly; teach children not 
to be ashamed of need and incompleteness but to see these as occasions for 
cooperation and reciprocity 
° Develop the capacity for genuine concern for others, both near and distant  
° Undermine the tendency to shrink from minorities of various kinds in disgust, 
thinking of them as “lower” and “contaminating”  
° Teach real and true things about other groups (racial, religious, and sexual 
minorities; people with disabilities), so as to counter stereotypes and the disgust 
that often goes with them 
° Promote accountability by treating each child as a responsible agent; 
° Vigorously promote critical thinking, the skill and courage it requires to raise a 
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dissenting voice."265 
If the governments would adopt the capability approach, then the authorities would have 
a clear target for their policies: Reaching a basic level of human capability for all the 
citizens. 
 
Both the capability approach and the list of capabilities have their roots in Aristotelian 
philosophy. For Aristotle everything had a purpose or an end, and for human beings this 
was ‘living well’ or reaching happiness (eudaimonia).266 Living well cannot be done if 
people do not use their capabilities. Nussbaum distinguishes between basic bodily 
capabilities and more sophisticated, social and emotional capabilities. From the list of 
capabilities, two stand out as most important: Practical reason and being in a 
community, because these make us distinctly human - as pointed out by Aristotle.267 In 
Aristotle’s view, phronêsis or practical reason is what makes us distinctly human, and 
Nussbaum’s conclusion from this is that governments should actively encourage the 
development of practical reason in their citizens. Education then should be about the 
third and most neglected form of knowledge so far, phronêsis. The other capability that 
makes us humans is living in a political community and, consequently, striving for a 
common good.268 The social aspect of humanity is very important for Aristotle because 
otherwise he would need to define humans as self-sufficient, egotistical, lonely beings.  
 
The list of capabilities is based on Aristotelian virtue ethics, a conception according to 
which human nature is composed of certain features and without any of these features 
there would be no humanity, let alone virtuous humanity. Martha Nussbaum’s list is 
meant to establish the minimal level of capabilities that people should have, in order not 
to exclude anyone from humanity.  
"the list does not derive from any extrahistorical metaphysical conception, or rely 
on the truth of any form of metaphysical realism. As I have said, its guiding 
intuition is that we do recognize as human, people who do not share our own 
metaphysical and religious ideas; it aims to get at the root of those recognitions. It 
does so by conducting an inquiry that is, frankly, both evaluative and internal to 
human history. Furthermore, the conception does not even demand universal 
actual agreement among human beings in order to play the moral and political 
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role that we want it to play."269 
The next argumentative step for Nussbaum is to connect some features of the list of 
capabilities with arts and humanities education:  
"These abilities are associated with the humanities and the arts: the ability to think 
critically; the ability to transcend local loyalties and to approach world problems 
as a “citizen of the world”; and, finally, the ability to imagine sympathetically the 
predicament of another person"270  
Nussbaum argues that the Socratic education, which is best practised in philosophy 
classes, leads to critical thinking, while the arts make students more empathetic and 
understanding towards those different from themselves, therefore any genuine 
democracy needs the humanities and arts. A common core of disciplines should be 
taught to everyone, from the first day of school, no matter the indented career path.  
 
A second line of argument is that not only democracies need the humanities, but also 
business, because the truly innovative and creative people have a liberal arts 
background.271 But Nussbaum does not develop this argument throughout the book, 
because citizenship and democracy are far more important than the perspective of 
corporate profit. 
 
Anticipating criticism, Nussbaum admits that humanistic education for all will not lead 
with certainty to morality, but that the lack of it will probably lead to undesirable 
results. "Knowledge is no guarantee of good behavior, but ignorance is a virtual 
guarantee of bad behavior."272 For the moment this is the best chance we have for 
constructing a democracy based on the principle of capabilities.  
"Colleges cannot convey the type of learning that produces global citizens unless 
they have a liberal arts structure: that is, a set of general education courses for all 
students outside the requirements of the major subject."273 
 
At this point it is worth mentioning that, while the capability approach may prima facie 
look similar to the Bologna focus on skills and competences, it is in fact wider and more 
inclusive. The competencies approach (CBET) had intended to prepare the student for 
employability, therefore all the skills and competences were instrumental for this 
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purpose. The competences are not valuable in themselves, therefore these can be 
dropped and replaced as the time passes and the labour market changes its demands; the 
list of competences cannot be fixed or settled once and for all. The capabilities are all 
needed in order to attain the good life, one cannot lose one without losing some 
essential aspect of autonomous life. Therefore, even if both competences and 
capabilities are instrumental, the 
list of capabilities when taken together are sufficient and each necessary in order to 
make a good life; while competences are neither necessary nor sufficient to make a 
good life.274 
 
Several authors have emphasised further differences between the competences and the 
capabilities approach. The place of individual freedom and autonomy differs radically in 
the two approaches. While in the capabilities approach the individual sets for herself the 
desired goals and the meaning of the good life, in the CBET approach the desirable life 
is linked with employability and keeping the social status quo. Therefore the 
competences do not allow for changing the political system, or for an agonistic notion 
of citizenship.275 Sen has argued that the individual’s autonomy can be defined by how 
much (s)he can change her/his environment. From this prspective, the CBET approach 
does not emphasise autonomy. The capability approach is inspired by the Aristotelian 
virtue ethics, while the competence approach has its roots in utilitarianism.276 
 
The argument in favour of humanities for democratic citizenship was not without its 
criticisms. The most frequent criticism met by Nussbaum’s project was linked to the 
political and historical bias of her list. Colm Kelly thinks that the list of capabilities to 
be developed through education is based on certain political sensibilities and that other 
political orientations might lead to a different list.277 If we lived in ancient Athens, we 
would add other types of capabilities on the list, and so would Renaissance or 
Enlightenment intellectuals. This argument misses the Aristotelian virtue ethicist 
argument that grounded the list. Just by reading the list of capabilities, without looking 
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at its grounding, one might think this is a postmodern list with sensitivity towards 
minorities. It certainly looks politically correct and multicultural. Such an uncharitable 
reading was put forth by Bruce Thornton278 who reads into Nussbaum's plea for 
humanities just a pandering to the fashion of the day in academia, namely 
multiculturalism and diversity, the "dominant orthodoxy on campus."279 But this is not 
the case: Nussbaum is not a postmodernist thinker, if anything she rejects clearly the 
cultural relativism associated with postmodernists.280 It can be argued that modern 
sensibilities and capabilities are more complex than the ancients’ and it is possible to 
construct a list of universal capabilities which define humanity at this point in time, 
while knowing that probably in the future this list will need further corrections as 
humanity develops its sensitivity and empathy. It is worth pointing out again that 
Nussbaum was the first to admit that the list is open-ended.  
 
Another objection to Nussbaum’s approach was put forth by Stanley Fish who thinks 
that the university curricula is not designed for a hierarchy of disciplines - and a 
hierarchy seems to be required if we accept that humanities have a special mission to 
maintain democracy. Fish thinks that all disciplines in the university should enjoy equal 
status, because each one studies a different facet of reality through the lens of a different 
methodology.281 Helen Small also subscribes to a modified version of this argument. 
She points out that a good argument in favour of humanities must be not diminish the 
importance of the other disciplines or forms of knowledge. Even though not entirely 
convincing, Small thinks that by associating ‘mostly’ humanities with critical thinking, 
Nussbaum implicitly diminishes any other form of critical thinking that might appear in 
political or social sciences, for example.282 
 
Stanley Fish thinks that the duty of university teaching is only to "introduce students to 
bodies of material new to them and equip those same students with the appropriate (to 
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the discipline) analytical and research skills."283 Anything more would turn the 
professor into a priest or therapist. 
"But who gave […] any other teacher employed by a college or university the 
authority first to decide what the world and his students need in the way of moral 
improvement, and second to turn his classroom into a social/ ethical laboratory? 
Isn't that straight indoctrination?"284 
"The only advocacy that should go on in the classroom is the advocacy of what 
James Murphy has identified as the intellectual virtues -- "thoroughness, 
perseverance, intellectual honesty" -- all components of the cardinal academic 
virtue of being "conscientious in the pursuit of truth" […] teachers should teach 
their subjects. They should not teach peace or war or freedom or obedience or 
diversity or uniformity or nationalism or antinationalism or any other agenda that 
might properly be taught by a political leader or a talk-show host. Of course they 
can and should teach about such topics -- something very different from urging 
them as commitments -- when they are part of the history or philosophy or 
literature or sociology that is being studied."285 
One can find a similar argument in Weber’s Science as a Vocation lecture, where 
Weber argued that science should not be used for any political ideal: 
"Now we cannot provide a university teacher with scientific proof of where his 
duty lies. All we can demand of him is the intellectual rectitude to realize that we 
are dealing with two entirely heterogeneous problems. On the one hand, we have 
the establishing of factual knowledge, the determining of mathematical or logical 
relations or the internal structure of cultural values. On the other, we have answers 
to questions about the value of culture and its individual products, and in addition, 
questions about how we should act in the civilized community and in political 
organizations. If he then asks why he cannot deal with both sets of problems in the 
lecture room, we should answer that the prophet and the demagogue have no place 
at the lectern."286 
Stanely Fish’s argument is not targeted at Nussbaum specifically, but at all the campus 
activists that wanted to turn the university in a force that would move society in the 
‘right’ direction. Nussbaum does not militate for activism in the university, although the 
reasons why she promotes critical thinking are politically motivated. But the exercise of 
critical thinking should remain neutral in the end, because otherwise the capability 
approach would not allow for autonomy (understood as setting one’s own goals) of the 
students. 
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Helen Small points out that the strength of Nussbaum’s argument is also its biggest 
weakness. Whereas the classical defences for the political relevance of humanities were 
useful only for the political elites and bureaucrats who had access to this type of 
education, Nussbaum thinks that all citizens need humanities because all citizens 
participate politically in a democracy. Small asks how we are going to achieve this. 
Nussbaum’s goal requires that 100% of citizens, not 40% of the age-relevant 
population,287 should enter the university and study humanities. The fact of the matter is 
that still only few people get an education in humanities, points out Small, so the 
democratic education ideal should be exchanged in favour of Mills’ more realistic 
democratic leadership of "the instructed few."288 Helen Small’s argument starts from 
the current situation and extends it to show how improbable change is. Nevertheless, 
Nussbaum’s argument was normative, she pointed out what we should strive for in a 
democracy, even if we cannot achieve it perfectly.  
 
A question which is not addressed in Nussbaum’s book is why should humanistic 
education continue beyond high-school? How are humanities linked to university 
anymore? If certain capabilities can be developed in all pupils, what are the advanced 
university courses adding to the high-school curriculum based on humanities? And, if 
the common university core has some mandatory courses in humanities (as the USA 
universities already do), why should anyone choose a major in humanities except for 
becoming a professor? Will the graduates in humanities have more advanced 
capabilities of citizenship than their social sciences colleagues or any other 
professionalised graduate? And, since there are so few humanities majors, are they more 
fit to be elected as political representatives?  
 
Another related problem is the central pedagogical role of the Socratic education in this 
approach. Emulating Socratic method means trying to institutionalise a type of 
education that was anti-institutional at its core. Helen Small argues that there is a "stark 
conflict between the isolated agitant role of the Socratic Philosopher and the 
institutionalized and professionalized function of the modern academic."289 Questioning 
authority of received knowledge, as Socrates did in Athens, will inevitably lead to 
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questioning the authority of the professor. Another problem is that the people capable of 
Socratic education need to have certain personal qualities such as charisma. It is hard to 
imagine a Socratic educator in every university, let alone every humanities class. 
Furthermore, Socratic education for critical thinking and education for artistic empathy 
can be done anywhere: in a garden, in a forest, in a marketplace, and probably would do 
better without grades and diplomas because these focus the student’s attention on the 
grade as a result, rather than on the process of learning. What is missing from 
Nussbaum’s argument is the link between humanities and the university. 
 
This concern arises from the contemporary decoupling of teaching from research which 
is not addressed at all in Nussbaum’s book. Humanities are praised for their educational 
virtues, while research is never addressed. Teaching seems to be severed from the 
public policymakers’ perspective too. Inside the EU, the Lisbon Research Agenda deals 
exclusively with the research, while the Bologna Process deals with teaching. The 
criteria for evaluating excellence are different for both processes: Researchers are 
graded on their ‘impact’ (usually understood as number and rank of publications), while 
faculties are evaluated by the employability of their graduates. In the chapter 1 of Not 
for Profit, Nussbaum describes how bleak the situation of humanities is nowadays and 
she mentions the underfunding of research, but an argument why research should be 
paired with teaching never appears in the book. It is hard to construct one from a 
perspective focused on phronêsis, when research is usually associated with episteme. 
Humboldt had defended research coupled with teaching because developing the intellect 
was a necessary component of Bildung, in order to achieve truly autonomous human 
beings. But Humboldt did not want politics in the university or a politically steered 
curricula. Nussbaum saves the public usefulness of humanities, but loses research and 
the university as a host institution for the humanities in the process.  
It is time to summarise our options in the next section. 
 
3.3 The Subject of Education: Individuals, Citizens or Elites 
 
We have seen so far that arguing for the value of humanities can be done in different 
ways and that the strategy changes along with the intended subject of education. 
Following Aristotle’s distinction between the education for the good man (what we 
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could construct as the Enlightenment disembodied ‘man’, not linked to any particular 
political regime) and the virtuous citizen, we were led to understand that different types 
of citizenship require different types of education because different virtues need to be 
developed. Educating people for moral excellence differs from educating them to obtain 
obedient citizens and it also differs from education for dissenting citizenship. If 
education is instrumental for the State, the ideal of citizenship promoted by the State 
will be essential in spelling out who needs to be educated. 
 
The arguments for humanities reviewed so far do not spell out who is being educated 
and what should (s)he become after the university education. Because of this 
misunderstanding, arguments for humanities develop into parallel discourses. Without 
taking first a stand on the issue of who is being educated, the risk is that we can never 
reach a conclusion. A related issue is what type of knowledge is promoted through the 
study of humanities. Starting from the Aristotelian tripartite division of knowledge, 
episteme, techne and phronêsis have each been emphasised as being essential for the 
humanities, sometimes all three together, but most of the times only one type of 
knowledge was deemed essential. A third issue regards the notion of citizenship. We 
have seen that, at some point, citizenship was involved in almost all the justifications of 
humanities, but the idea of citizenship differed greatly across the justification models. 
Let us revise next what were the options we have outlined so far. 
 
A) Who is being educated? The political and administrative elites 
 
Starting from the Renaissance, when the term studia humanitatis began to be used, the 
humanities were the disciplines that could build the character of the pupils in order to 
make them worthy of a public office. The students of humanities all came from good 
families and were supposed to become the future administrative elites, such as notaries, 
secretaries, clerks. The humanistic education was not accessible to the poor because the 
public functions were not open for them. "These studies were deemed foundational for 
adolescent males from good families who aimed to pursue the active life of the citizen 
or subject in the service of the state."290 
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In order to mould the character of the student into a virtuous and obedient citizen, the 
humanities appealed to all three types of knowledge: episteme (in the study of ancient 
history), techne (in the study of rhetoric), and phronêsis (through the study of moral 
philosophy). Jennifer Summit argues that in the Renaissance it was the only period in 
history when the three types of knowledge blended harmoniously to define the 
humanities.291 This harmony was lost when in the 20th and 21th century the elite training 
remained a goal for humanities, but the phronetic part of knowledge was forgotten, 
argues Summit.  
 
A study by Pierre Bourdieu has shown that in the 20th century France les grandes écoles 
were highly selective in their admission process and effectively were training the future 
political and administrative elite of France. The humanities were a barrier in the form of 
an entrance exam in the grandes écoles that ensured that only those with the cultural or 
social capital could get in and also graduate. A similar situation has been described in 
the UK by the sociologists Brown and Scase. Their study found that the education 
provided by the elite universities such as Oxford and Cambridge is emphatically 
non-useful and focused on the humanities, as a way to distinguish these universities 
from the other universities where the labour class can enter. This type of education will 
ensure the access in the managerial and political elite of the UK.292  
The sociological studies by Bourdieu, Brown and Scase construe this situation as unfair 
and elitist, because humanities are used merely to conserve the social status of the few 
privileged. However this negative characterisation can be explained by the lack of 
phronetic knowledge in the humanities education. Without character building, the 
humanities are just the means employed by a class to keep its status, and the graduates 
cannot justify why they are the best candidates for political and administrative positions. 
 
B) Who is being educated? ‘Man’ as such 
 
The second goal of education was ‘Man’, understood as a universal category, and this 
was proposed by several Enlightenment thinkers, most famously by Wilhelm von 
Humboldt and Immanuel Kant. This was almost a democratic movement because 
Humboldt aimed to give a chance to bright young men to enter the elite through merit 
                                                          
291 Summit 670–71. 
292 Brown and Scase, Higher Education and Corporate Realities, 18. 
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alone. These candidates needed first to be educated into freedom and autonomy, through 
Bildung. After becoming autonomous individuals, the free citizens would serve the state 
in a better way than they could have done it if they were trained into obedience. Bildung 
as training through pure science was opposed to professional training, and it was cast as 
the prerequisite before any specialisation took place. If the graduate would not go any 
further into specialisation, he would still remain a ‘cultivated man’.  
 
We find again the divergence between episteme and techne at the core of the 
educational project, while the superiority of episteme comes as a presupposition. The 
education through Bildung is intended for any individual endowed with reason, so it is 
not fit for the political goals of a particular state. The outcome of education after the 
Humboldtian vision is the cultivated individual who will obey his own internal 
universal moral law, a perfect citizen for every possible state. This type of education 
focused on episteme with the goal of achieving phronêsis neglected emphatically 
techne. General culture was the precondition for any specialised knowledge. 
 
‘Man’ understood as a universal subject of education implied that anyone could be 
educated into humanities because everyone deserved to be autonomous. However in 
reality the recipients of education were only the white Christian males of some fortune. 
As seen from the postmodernists’ criticism of Bildung, humanistic education in the 
Enlightenment was just another meta-narrative used to legitimise certain social 
structures. By being emphatically apolitical, humanistic education was in effect serving 
the political system at that time, whichever it happened to be.  
 
C) Who is being educated? The European Employable Citizen 
 
Recent changes in European educational policies, most obviously present in the 
Bologna Process, but which started in the 80s, cannot be in agreement with the previous 
educational ideals. The reforms in education came out after the massification of 
education. A mass-system of higher education cannot claim to produce elites anymore, 
nor ‘cultivated men’. After the Bologna Process the subject of education is nowadays 
the European citizen defined in a narrow way as the active, mobile and employable 
worker. Employability is given by a set of skills and competences that are not fixed and 
vary with the demands of the labour market. The Bologna Process changed the 
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paradigm of higher education by requiring it to be ‘useful’ and this was measured in 
how well an institution provides its graduates with employable skills. In the opposition 
between theoretical and vocational, between episteme and techne, the BP took the side 
of techne because at least the vocational education promised to be useful.  
 
After the massification of education and the new imperatives of usefulness, episteme 
and techne were forced to coexist and compete for the same resources inside the 
university. This competition had no precedent. Now the humanities had to be defended 
against other disciplines not on epistemic grounds, but on grounds of usefulness. 
Education cannot claim to pursue the ideal of fostering the ‘cultivated man’ when 
society explicitly asks for specialists, employable European citizens. 
 
The classical and modern defences of humanities have their problems, but so does the 
attack staged by the BP on the humanities. The BP cannot justify why the general goal 
of a useful education needs to be translated into employability, which is just assumed to 
be a desirable state for any graduate. Who should decide in general what is useful and 
what is not? Does usefulness in the short term count as much as the usefulness in the 
long term? Because, as Sharon Rider has shown, theoretical discoveries may become 
extremely useful through their applications in the far away future, discouraging the 
specialisation in certain narrow areas of science or humanities, the so-called ‘orchid 
studies’, may deprive humanity of innovative discoveries in the long term.  
 
Another problem with the BP is its narrow vision on citizenship which excludes many 
categories of people. Disabled, pensioners, children, immigrants - all these persons are 
not ‘active European citizens’ fit for the ‘Europe of Knowledge.’ Anyone living on 
social benefits is not a full citizen, but a burden for the Europe of Knowledge. When the 
BP policy-makers speak of social inclusion, they intend the right of all to have an 
education that will lead to employability. A larger discourse of social inclusion, by 
considering those not (self-)employed in the classical sense such as housewives, 
caretakers, freelancers, and NGO volunteers as equally valuable citizens is not to be 
found; nor is the meaningful life outside employment or self-employment even 
mentioned as a possibility. The exclusionary aspect of the educational policies is not 
addressed in the literature analysed so far, therefore the notion of citizenship that 
emerges from the textual analysis of the Bologna Process related documents deserves 
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further study and should constitute a future direction of research. 
 
A common problem with the justifications of humanities provided so far was that they 
were based on a hierarchical understanding of knowledge and disciplines. Humanities 
needed to be taught in the academia because humanities were better than the mere 
vocational disciplines, usually because episteme was conceived as more valuable than 
techne. Being a cultivated man was better than being a mere specialist. This was the 
logic of the humanistic disciplines: ‘better than’. Once the BP changed the discourse on 
higher education and technical knowledge was presented as more valuable, humanities 
were left without justification. They could not turn back to Bildung, or to the elitist 
character training. A new type of argument is needed.  
 
There were philosophers who thought that humanities need not justify themselves in 
terms of utility. But what they failed to understand was that the criticism of humanities 
coming from the BP inspired policies was not a theoretical criticism. This issue could 
not be settled inside academia anymore, through long debates in scholarly journals. 
These were not the 60’s culture wars brought back to life, these were the ‘usefulness 
wars’ and the debate needed to include all the stakeholders in higher education: 
students, parents, employers, politicians. 
 
D) Who is being educated? The dissenting citizen 
 
The dispute between episteme and techne may be transcended by getting out of this 
dichotomy and choosing a third option: practical wisdom, or phronêsis. This was the 
strategy employed by Martha Nussbaum who argued that humanities are useful now 
more than ever, that humanistic education should not deliver employable graduates, but 
something more important: citizens fit for democracy. This defence of humanities 
manages to save the teaching of humanities, but not research. Episteme is sacrificed so 
that phronêsis may triumph. After Nussbaum’s defence of the humanities it is not clear 
why the humanities belong to the university more than in any other institutional space, 
such as the Agora.  
 
This argument in favour of the humanities does have an advantage over the arguments 
listed in the first chapter: It includes policy makers as recipients of the message, it is not 
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just another intellectual debate among scholars, but aimed at the world outside academia 
which actually funds the humanities. It accepts the current point of view focused on 
usefulness, but it redefines usefulness not as a measure of utilitarian total satisfaction, 
neither as the wealth of the nation, but as democratic citizenship. As an argument for 
democratic citizenship based on creating capabilities, it embraces a pluralistic definition 
of citizenship, compatible with agonistic citizenship. Its main advantage is that it leaves 
to the students the open option of dissenting and thus affirming their agency against the 
state. It is also an argument that does not pay lip service to the idea of multiple 
stakeholders. In the BP there are many stakeholders, but most of them are silent: The 
students, the parents, the universities, have no say in what should be the goal of 
education or just choose not to exercise their right of dissent; by implementing these 
policies, the universities implicitly approve these policies. According to Nussbaum’s 
capability approach, each individual needs to set her own goals and values, with no 
interference from the policy makers. Nussbaum’s account of citizenship is more 
democratic than the Bologna notion of the ‘active and mobile citizen’ and it includes a 
more comprehensive notion of usefulness, because usefulness needs to be judged on an 
individual basis by looking at how many capabilities were fostered in each individual. 
Since we live in a globalised world in which we inadvertently influence other’s lives, 
Nussbaum pleads for the notion of ‘global citizenship’ or ‘citizens of the world’. 
Education for democratic citizenship means education for all, and this implies a truly 
democratic ‘usefulness for all’. ‘All’ in this context must be understood as all people on 
earth. We cannot plead for humanistic education in the USA without understanding that 
people in India need just as much this education, as well as the Europeans. 
 
Nussbaum’s proposal is so far the only competitor for the BP policies in the real life 
because it plays on the same level as the BP the ‘usefulness’ game, even though its 
playing field is not the university ground. As a normative justification of ‘usefulness’, 
Nussbaum’s proposal has certain advantages, such as inclusion, and is better grounded 
in a philosophical theory. In contrast, the BP has utilitarian assumptions which are never 
explicitly stated or argued for. It remains a direction of further study to what extent the 
humanities can be linked back to the institutional setting of universities in this account. 
But as a response to the current attack on humanities, Nussbaum’s argument seems to 
be the most resilient so far. 
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Conclusions 
 
Socrates once said that "the unexamined life is not worth living."293 For centuries it has 
been the purpose of humanities to examine the assumptions of the mainstream 
conceptions about the human life, and give people the necessary tools to examine their 
own lives. If anyone could answer the challenge posed by the Bologna Process to our 
understandings of education and the good life, then humanities should be the best 
candidates. However, humanities are now in a crisis of self-justification intensified by 
the Bologna Process. Humanities have always experienced a status of crisis; it is their 
way of reinventing themselves, yet the crisis that arose after the launch of the Bologna 
Process is of a special nature, institutional and educational. 
 
In our society there are many conflicting images about education in the humanities. 
First there are those who believe that humanities will lead nowhere and are just a waste 
of time and resources for both students and taxpayers. In the end, "university students 
focusing on the humanities may end up, at least in their parents’ nightmares, as 
dog-walkers for those majoring in computer science."294 Second, there is an image of 
defiance or indifference, promoted by those who value humanities for their eye-opening 
character; these people argue that the meaning of the ‘good life’ should not be dictated 
by policy-makers, that one should choose whether to be employable or not. Ultimately 
the relation between employment and one’s self-image should be self-decided because a 
valuable life is not necessarily focused on (self-)employment. 
 
Writer Alain de Botton recently noticed that our collective imagination is haunted by 
the shame of not having or not gaining enough money:  
"Money has in many ways replaced sex as a focus of shame. The ability to make 
money and be financially independent has been raised into a primary marker of 
whether someone deserves to count as an acceptable human being. The shame of 
failing financially is so great that a number of people every year will prefer to kill 
themselves than call out for help (the current financial crisis has seen a 
characteristic and expected rise in the suicide rate across the developed world)."295 
It can be argued that, in our times, employment is another locus of shame. The shame 
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bestowed upon the unemployed can be seen in the way politicians speak of ‘welfare 
tourism’ or the burden of ageing population, and in the way people usually regard the 
homeless and the beggars as the pariah of our streets. If being unemployed is a shameful 
position, then the politician’s concern for employability can gain legitimacy in the 
public eyes. 
 
We have seen that there are several arguments why employability should not be the 
main interpretation for ‘usefulness’ in education. Some authors argue that the focus on 
employability is a good excuse for European governments to give up on regulating the 
labour market, and instead transfer the responsibility on the citizens’ shoulders. If being 
employed is construed as having employable skills, then the state can only invest in 
training those skills and, after the education is over, if there are still unemployed people, 
it means it is their fault they were unemployable. A current debate concerns whether the 
labour market is too regulated or unregulated; this debate should benefit from taking 
into account the construction of ‘employability’ through the educational policies in the 
BP. Others have argued that by constructing the set of employable skills as a response 
to the demands of today’s labour market, this leaves the future employees incapable of 
meeting the changed demands in tomorrow’s labour market. Some argue that the labour 
market’s demands cannot be predicted in principle, and therefore people should 
construct their life around life-long learning, discarding old skills and gaining new ones 
as they age. However, this model is oblivious to the fact that a future of the labour 
market may be dominated by automation, as argued by Luciano Floridi. Employment in 
sectors of the economy that we today think of as important may not be where the jobs 
will be created tomorrow. What will it mean in the future for people to have a fulfilling 
and purposeful life when employment will be reduced to just a few hours a week? We 
need to remain open to the possibility that the good life of the future will not be the 
(self-)employed life, the active and mobile model proposed now by the EU. People will 
need to be active in other fields, not strictly related to bread-winning. Other capacities 
will need to be used in order to make use of one’s time, and these capacities are now 
dropped from education in order to construct the employable European citizen.  
 
The Bologna ideal of education is more perishable than what first meets the eye. It is 
connected with a certain view of what it means to be employable, of what the future 
labour market’s needs will be, and its time dimension is quite narrow. In order to face 
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the challenges of the future labour markets, as BP had claimed it prepares its students to 
do, one needs a wider understanding of what it means to have a good life. One way of 
defending the humanities is to claim that it is equivalent to defending a plurality of 
educational purposes, the right to build one’s life based on an education that is not 
submitted to the political goals of the day, ultimately the right to have a dissenting voice 
and a different perspective on life. 
 
 
The main finding of this study was to show that, before deciding what type of education 
society needs, we need to understand who we are educating through our universities. 
Taking a stance on “who should we educate?” is prior to being able to judge educational 
policies. This decision requires a previous justification that requires arguments taken 
from the field of social justice: Who needs to be educated and who has the right to be 
educated? Furthermore, we have seen that all answers we have examined to the question 
underlying educational policies, i.e. ‘who is being educated?’, were linked at some level 
with the citizenship issue. By defining who is a full citizen, an answer to the question 
who had the right to a humanistic education was implicitly answered. Nussbaum’s 
project to universalise the definition of democratic citizenship would ensure a basis for 
providing humanistic education for all. Such a line of arguing would provide humanities 
to the well-regarded status they had starting from the Renaissance times, but this time 
not as a device for exclusion, but inclusion for all. We have tried to show that, by 
defending the humanities, one defends the idea of a plurality of educational purposes, 
the right to build one’s life based on an education that is not submitted to the political 
goals of the day, ultimately the right to have a dissenting voice and a different 
perspective on life. By defending humanities, one defends the true ‘usefulness’ of 
education, namely its potential for constructing democratic citizenship for all. 
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